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ABSTRACT
Netflix, Amazon, YouTube, and Apple have been joined by Disney+, Twitch,
Facebook, and others to supplant the broadcast industry. As the FCC, FTC, and other
regulators struggle, a new digital divide has emerged. The current regulatory regime
for television is built upon the government’s right to manage over-the-air
broadcasting. As content producers shift away from broadcast and cable, much of
the government’s regulatory control will end, resulting in new consequences for
public policy and new challenges involving privacy, advertising, and antitrust law.
Despite the technological change, there are compelling government interests in
a healthy media environment. This article explores the constitutionally valid
approaches available to discourage discrimination and digital redlining and instead
promote the public interest embodied in the Communications Act. Even as broadcast
regulation fades away many of the goals should be pursued, including the promotion
of diversity of viewpoint, access to news and educational content, and the fostering
of cultural content for those without the financial resources to buy broadband access.
In addition, the tracking technologies inherent in online media create a compelling
need to protect from the heightened risks to personal privacy. The article calls upon
the FTC to become the lead regulator, enforcing the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and
the FTC Act’s provisions to assure that competition, online advertising, customer
privacy, and the public interest are rigorously enforced.
INTRODUCTION
The global entertainment and media industries now exceed two trillion dollars
in annual revenue, with the majority of that revenue generated by digital content.1
Despite its size, however, the economic impact is secondary to the power of these
industries to shape political thought, religious faith, and cultural norms across
society.2 Moreover, modern digital media includes both commercial content
producers and a multitude of platforms enabling direct, person-to-person media
interactions that shape social media, political thought, and public discourse. Each of
these modalities is distinct, but they overlap in a multitude of ways, challenging
regulators and frustrating public policy agendas.
For over a century, Congress has struggled to balance public policy
considerations and technical regulations with a multitude of legal, cultural, and
economic challenges inherent to media and broadcasting. The origins of these efforts
began with the Copyright Act of 1909 and the Radio Act of 1912. While the
Copyright Act was not wholly revised until 1976, the Radio Act lasted only until
1. PWC, PERSPECTIVES FROM THE GLOBAL ENTERTAINMENT & MEDIA OUTLOOK 2019-2023,
GETTING PERSONAL: PUTTING THE ME IN ENTERTAINMENT AND MEDIA (2019), https://www.pwc.com/gx
/en/entertainment-media/outlook-2019/entertainment-and-media-outlook-perspectives-2019-2023.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K8LF-REX9].
2. See, e.g., STIG HJARVARD, THE MEDIATIZATION OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY (2013); RONALD
INGLEHART, MODERNIZATION AND POSTMODERNIZATION: CULTURAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL
CHANGE IN 43 SOCIETIES 70 (1997) (“[A] broad syndrome of changes has been linked with modern
economic development. These changes include urbanization, industrialization, occupational
specialization, mass formal education, development of mass media, secularization, individuation, the
rise of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial motivations, bureaucratization, the mass production assembly
line, and the emergence of the modern state.”).
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1927.
The development of the Internet, social media, and mobile telecommunications
technology has significantly increased these challenges. Governments face demands
to regulate new technologies, manage the broadcast spectrum, control
anticompetitive behavior, protect consumers, increase privacy, discourage tobacco
use, police advertising, and foster the public good. And unlike much of the world,
in the United States, these goals are further constrained by a constitutional imperative
to “make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”3
Largely unnoticed in the growth of digital distribution services for entertainment
and media content has been the diminution of AM, FM, and UHF broadcasting as a
structural component of public media consumption. As digitization continues, the
use of analog digital airwaves is beginning to fade away. With the demise of overthe-air broadcasting, much of the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC)
jurisdiction will disappear as well.
This article addresses the transition from a broadcast-based regulatory model to
its alternative. The article will also address some of the implications for
entertainment and media producers and for content publicly produced.
I. THE RISE OF FEDERAL MEDIA REGULATION
By 1901, Marchese Guglielmo Marconi had transformed Heinrich Hertz’s radio
experiments into successful point-to-point wireless communications.4 Radio was
moved under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy because of its military importance 5
and the need to safeguard commercial shipping.6 The initial regulation was the
Wireless Ship Act of 1910,7 but that was quickly supplanted. The Radio Act of 1912
moved jurisdiction to the Department of Commerce and Labor, added provisions
regarding foreign ownership, and included many specific regulations regarding the
airwaves directly into the text of the Act. 8
“By 1912, the U.S. subsidiary of the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company, the
Marconi Company of America, controlled nearly all civilian maritime wireless
communications from shore stations in the United States and handled most of the
nation’s other commercial wireless traffic.”9 However, Marconi’s technology was

3. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute,
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263 (1961) (“In my view, ‘the people need free speech’ because they have
decided, in adopting, maintaining, and interpreting their Constitution, to govern themselves rather than
to be governed by others.”).
4. HUGH R. SLOTTEN, RADIO AND TELEVISION REGULATION: BROADCAST TECHNOLOGY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1920–1960, at 3 (2000).
5. Rita Zajacz, Liberating American Communications: Foreign Ownership Regulations from the
Radio Act of 1912 to the Radio Act of 1927, 48 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 157, 163 (2004).
6. See Daniel D. Hoolihan, Titanic, Marconi’s “Wireless Telegraphers” and the U. S. Radio Act
of 1912, 5 IEEE ELECTROMAGNETIC COMPATIBILITY MAG. 35, 37 (2016) (“As a result of the Titanic’s
disaster and the subsequent congressional investigation, the U. S. Government passed the Radio Act of
1912.”).
7. Wireless Ship Act of 1910, ch. 262, 36 Stat. 629 (1910) (amended 1912).
8. See Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302, repealed by Radio Act of 1927, ch. 652, 48 Stat.
1162.
9. SLOTTEN, supra note 4, at 3.
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crude,10 and each point-to-point transmission created significant radio interference
for other broadcasters. American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T or the Bell
System) and General Electric (GE) were both competing to patent more efficient
technologies.11 Marconi Company of America was forced to withdraw from the
United States in the face of governmental concerns regarding foreign ownership of
radio and pressure to Americanize the technology with the advent of World War I. 12
Encouraged by the War Department, GE acquired Marconi Company of America
and launched the Radio Corporation of America (RCA). 13 Joined by Westinghouse
and United Fruit Company, this emerging group of radio, telephony, and technology
companies entered into patent licensing and economic agreements that segregated
and promoted the growth of the radio industry, wireless telephone industry, and
equipment manufacturing.14 The heart of this arrangement was President Woodrow
Wilson’s view that global “pre-eminence would be determined by three factors: oil,
transportation, and communication. The United States was predominant in oil, but
Britain could not be challenged in transportation or cable communications.”15 If the
United States could capture the wireless communications industry, it could split
communications with Britain, resulting in “a standoff between the two powers.” 16
During this same post-war period, the Department of Commerce’s role began to
change as technology continued to develop. For example, “[t]he war accelerated the
development of the art [of radio frequencies] . . . and in 1921 the first standard
broadcast stations were established. They grew rapidly in number, and by 1923 there
were several hundred such stations throughout the country.” 17
Furthermore, Herbert Hoover took over the department in 1921 and transformed
it into a regulatory powerhouse that focused on helping businesses, establishing
standardization, and promoting the economy.18 The emerging broadcast industry

10. Id. (“Spark transmitters generated radio frequency signals as byproducts of electromagnetic
sparking across induction coils. . . . Tuning to one frequency was difficult, interference among
transmitters was a major problem, and the technology was not entirely satisfactory for voice
transmission, or telephony.”).
11. Id.
12. See MARC RABOY, MARCONI: THE MAN WHO NETWORKED THE WORLD 443-44 (2016) (“RCA
took over British Marconi’s interest in its American subsidiary, including the right to use Marconi’s
patents in the United States. . . . RCA took over not only the American Marconi patents, but also
Marconi’s high-power stations . . . and Marconi’s 37.5 percent interest in the Pan-American Wireless
Telegraph and Telephone Company.”); W. J. BAKER, A HISTORY OF THE MARCONI COMPANY 19741965, at 181 (1970) (“American Marconi Company . . . had no alternative therefor but to discuss terms
and eventually agree to the sale of its holdings. Thus, on 17 October 1919, the Radio Corporation of
America came into being.”).
13. See ROBERT CAMPBELL, THE GOLDEN YEARS OF BROADCASTING: A CELEBRATION OF THE
FIRST 50 YEARS OF RADIO AND TV ON NBC 50 (1976).
14. See SLOTTEN, supra note 4, at 5; MICHELE HILMES, ONLY CONNECT 43 (4th ed. 2013)
(“Westinghouse and the American Telephone and Telegraph Corporation [AT&T] became part of RCA
in 1920. In 1921 the United Fruit Company became a minor partner, because of its involvement in radio
communication in its fruit shipping.”).
15. RABOY, supra note 12, at 441.
16. Id.
17. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1943).
18. ANTHONY RUDEL, HELLO, EVERYBODY! THE DAWN OF AMERICAN RADIO 40 (2008).
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became one of Hoover’s areas of focus. 19 Nonetheless, the aggressive control
Hoover sought to impose on the fledgling radio industry was met with legal
challenges to his plenary authority. 20
The radio industry grew at unprecedented speed. In 1922, five radio stations
were on the air, but by the next year, the number had increased to 556.21 Because of
previous antitrust concerns involving the Bell System, AT&T elected to relinquish
its efforts at public radio broadcasting to continue its focus—and monopoly—on
both wired telephony and wireless telegraphy for point-to-point communication.22
By 1926, the business of telephony had split from the fledgling radio broadcasting
industry. AT&T sold its two radio stations to RCA along with all network
operations.23 RCA used the assets to create the National Broadcasting Company
(NBC) through a partnership with GE.
The Commerce Secretary faced a series of defeats to his control over the
increasingly rapid demand for broadcast licenses. 24 With decisions in 1926 from
both the courts and the Acting Attorney General turning against Hoover’s use of the
Radio Act of 1912, something had to be done. The frustrations of Secretary Hoover,
the rapid expansion of broadcast radio, and the market power of RCA and NBC to
reach across America created the force necessary for a new regulation of the
airwaves.
The Radio Act of 1927 moved regulation of radio away from the Department of
Commerce to a new, freestanding organization, the Federal Radio Commission
(FRC).25 In response to the limitation of the Radio Act of 1912 and the ministerial
view of the legislation upheld in Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co.,26 Congress included
judicial review of broadcast licenses27 in the Act, but the courts subsequently limited
the extent of that authority. 28 Congress also introduced the bases for broadcast

19. Id. at 41 (“[L]isteners . . . found [that] the constant static made listening difficult, [so] radio in
1921 was an ideal candidate for government intervention and Hoover’s brand of organization.”).
20. See, e.g., Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“In the present
case the duty of naming a wave length is mandatory upon the Secretary. The only discretionary act is in
selecting a wave length, within the limitations prescribed in the statute, which, in his judgment, will
result in the least possible interference.”).
21. Robert Gobetz, Communications Act of 1934, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/event/Communications-Act-of-1934 [https://perma.cc/SCV2-VUNG] (last visited Dec.
17, 2020).
22. See FCC, INVESTIGATION OF THE TELEPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES 230 (1939); 1
PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 1.3.3 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp. 2014).
23. 100 Years, A Visual Memoir of RCA, RADIO CORP. OF AMERICA, https://www.rca.com/us_en
/our-legacy-266-us-en [https://perma.cc/Q7QS-H547] (last visited Nov. 24, 2020).
24. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926); Fed. Regul. of Radio
Broad., 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 126, 127 (1926), 1926 U.S. AG LEXIS 7, at *8; Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943) (“[O]pinion of Acting Attorney General Donovan [stated] that the
Secretary of Commerce had no power, under the Radio Act of 1912, to regulate the power, frequency or
hours of operation of stations.” (citing Fed. Regul. of Radio Broad., 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 126)).
25. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 3, 44 Stat. 1162, 1162, repealed by Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, §1, 48. Stat. 1064, 1064.
26. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1006-07 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
27. Radio Act of 1927 § 16.
28. Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Gen. Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1930) (providing that a de novo
trial would violate the principle of separation of powers if held for the purpose of determining whether a
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licenses to be granted, including where “public convenience, interest, or necessity”
will be served.29
The Radio Act of 1927 also reinforced the separation between telephony and
radio. In this way, the regulation reflected the structural approach to radio and
telephone that the Bell System and RCA had negotiated through their cross-licensing
arrangements. RCA, with its NBC network of broadcasting stations, would control
the airwaves, while the Bell System would maintain a monopoly over telephones and
the nation’s telecommunications grid.30 The Radio Act “forbade cross-ownership of
telephone companies and broadcasting stations and flatly rejected the operation of
radio stations as ‘common carriers.’” 31
These changes, along with rules for telephony and common carriage, were then
updated and combined into the Communications Act of 1934, which established the
regulatory regime for the next half century. 32 As described by the Department of
Justice, the Communications Act was
an expansive statute regulating U.S. telephone, telegraph, television, and radio
communications. Its seven subchapters regulate virtually all aspects of the
communications and broadcasting industry, including assignment of frequencies,
rates and fees, standards, competition, terms of subscriber access, commercials,
broadcasting in the public interest, government use of communications systems.
The Act also provides for more detailed regulation and oversight via the
establishment of the FCC.33

The transition from the Radio Act of 1927 to the Communications Act of 1934
was part of the broader efforts of President Franklin Roosevelt to create a permanent
body to replace the FRC and incorporate interstate telephone and telegraph
regulation as common carriers into the newly formed FCC, rather than the
Department of Commerce.34
For radio, and television when it began to broadcast after World War II, the
fundamental issue was what Congress meant by the public interest, convenience, and
necessity.35
Writing in 1930, Louis G. Caldwell, the former General Counsel of the FRC,
explained the meaning behind the language as he understood it when first adopted
into the Radio Act:
Instead of telling the Commission to do the best it can, however, Congress has done

license should issue, since that role would create in the courts a licensing function which is legislative in
character).
29. Radio Act of 1927 § 4.
30. HUBER ET AL., supra note 22, at 1-19 (“The Radio Act of 1927 sealed the deal. It reaffirmed
the general prohibition of ‘monopoly’ of the airwaves—meaning that competition over the airwaves was
prohibited, at least if it came from Bell.”).
31. Id.
32. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 to
646).
33. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., Privacy and Civil Liberty, The Communications Act of 1934, JUST. INFO.
SHARING, http://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1288 [https://perma.cc/KK2R-HRRW]
(Nov. 27, 2013).
34. Communications Act of 1934 § 4.
35. See Communications Act of 1934 §§ 4, 214, 303, 307, 309, 312, 319.

2020]

DYSREGULATING THE MEDIA

51

virtually the same thing by instructing it that all its acts must meet the standard of
“public interest, convenience or necessity” . . . . “Public interest, convenience or
necessity” means about as little as any phrase that the drafters of the Act could have
used and still comply with the constitutional requirement that there be some standard
to guide the administrative wisdom of the licensing authority. 36

Caldwell did not put much value in the phrase, pointing out that the terms were
generally associated with state and federal licensing commissions to help rationalize
the basis on which utility monopolies and other government grants were
apportioned.37 He further noted, however, that “as a matter of history . . . each of the
four National Radio Conferences called, and presided over, by President Hoover
when Secretary of Commerce, emphasized the interest of the listening public as the
paramount consideration in the regulation of broadcasting.” 38 Section 9 of the Radio
Act emphasized the need to give “fair, efficient and equitable radio service” among
the states and the communities within the states.39
The use of the public interest, convenience, and necessity standard was
incorporated without change into the Communications Act of 1934 and continued to
have little structural impact on the provision of radio licenses.
II. CONTENT REGULATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
One of the challenges to understanding the public interest, convenience, and
necessity standard stems from its intersection with the prohibitions of the First
Amendment. For broadcasting, it is reasonable to assume that neither Congress nor
the courts considered the First Amendment to be directly applicable at the time of
the legislative enactment in 1927 or 1934.
A. Early Cases Rejecting the First Amendment
In 1915, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the scope of the First Amendment
with regard to motion pictures and theatrical productions. In Mutual Film Corp. v.
Industrial Commission of Ohio,40 the Court rejected the limitation of the state
constitution on the power of the state to censor motion pictures or to restrict the
issuance of licenses.41 Although based on Ohio law, the constitutional protection in
question provided that “no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of
speech, or of the press.”42 Instead, the Court rejected the spectacle of film as within
the ambit of protected speech.
36. Louis G. Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the
Radio Act of 1927, 1 AIR L. REV. 295, 296 (1930) (“The underlying theory is, however, perfectly sound;
only an indefinite and very elastic standard should be prescribed for the regulation of an art and a field
of human endeavor which is progressing and changing at so rapid a pace as is radio communication.”).
37. Id. at 303-06 (“‘This phrase, “common convenience and necessity,” has no legal meaning
except when used to indicate a public necessity which justifies some act affecting the rights of person or
property which would not be justifiable if that necessity did not exist.’” (quoting In re Shelton St. Ry.
Co., 38 A. 362, 363 (Conn. 1897))).
38. Id. at 324.
39. Id. at 324-25 (quoting Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 9, 44 Stat. 1162, 1166 (repealed 1934)).
40. 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
41. Id. at 244.
42. Id. at 239 n.1.
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[T]he argument is wrong or strained which extends the guaranties of free opinion
and speech to the multitudinous shows which are advertised on the billboards of our
cities and towns . . . and which seeks to bring motion pictures and other spectacle
into practical and legal similitude to a free press and liberty of opinion.43

Once the Radio Act was passed, there were specific provisions relevant to
speech regulation. Section 29 provided that “[n]o person within the jurisdiction of
the United States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of
radio communication.”44
In Duncan v. United States,45 the Ninth Circuit upheld an early criminal
conviction for violation of section 29, finding the broadcaster used vulgar and
profane language to attack certain local politicians. 46 The opinion reviewed the
extent to which the Tenth Amendment governed the authority of the federal
government to restrict the criminal prosecution to the states but never addressed
either the Free Speech Clause or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Instead, the court found a sufficient basis for a criminal conviction. The opinion
explained that “the indictment having alleged that the language is profane, the
defendant having referred to an individual as ‘damned,’ having used the expression
‘By God’ irreverently, and having announced his intention to call down the curse of
God upon certain individuals,” was sufficient under the statute to uphold the
conviction for violating the statutory injunction against the use of profane language
in radio broadcasting.47
The First Amendment was directly addressed in Trinity Methodist Church,
South v. Federal Radio Commission.48 The Reverend Doctor Robert Shuler was a
firebrand evangelist who operated the radio station KGEF (Keep God Ever First),
broadcasting “sensational rather than instructive” content. 49 He had twice been
convicted of attempting to obstruct justice using his broadcasts. 50
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted
the shift in First Amendment jurisprudence away from allowing any form of prior
restraint,51 but the court distinguished the exercise of a prior restraint to enjoin a
publication or broadcast from the regulatory function of the FCC to grant or withhold
license renewals.
43. Id. at 243-44. The Court continued in its condemnation:
[T]he exhibition of moving pictures is a business, pure and simple, originated and
conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded
by the Ohio Constitution, we think, as part of the press of the country or as organs of public
opinion. They are mere representations of events, of ideas and sentiments published and
known, vivid, useful, and entertaining, no doubt, but, as we have said, capable of evil,
having power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition.
Id. at 244.
44. Radio Act of 1927 § 29.
45. 48 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1931).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 62 F.2d 850, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
49. Id. at 851.
50. Id.
51. Id. (“[T]he universal trend of decisions has recognized the guaranty of the amendment to
prevent previous restraints upon publications, as well as immunity of censorship, leaving to correction
by subsequent punishment those utterances or publications contrary to the public welfare.”).
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But this does not mean that the government, through agencies established by
Congress, may not refuse a renewal of license to one who has abused it to broadcast
defamatory and untrue matter. In that case there is not a denial of the freedom of
speech, but merely the application of the regulatory power of Congress in a field
within the scope of its legislative authority.52

The court was again clear to distinguish between censorship and “the legitimate
exercise of governmental powers for the public good.”53 “This is neither censorship
nor previous restraint, nor is it a whittling away of the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment, or an impairment of their free exercise.”54
Though Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson55 was decided between the adoption of
the Radio Act and the Communications Act, the statutory authority of the law also
mirrored the distinction made by the court in Trinity Methodist Church, South.
Congress did not give statutory authority to censor radio communication or signals,
but it did give the FRC and later the FCC the power to issue licenses, and Congress
gave the Justice Department the authority to bring criminal actions for violation of
the law barring the broadcast of “any obscene, indecent, or profane language.”56
B. Introducing the Application of the First Amendment
The recognition that the First Amendment applied to radio was made by the
Supreme Court in its 1943 decision, National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,57
where the Court acknowledged that Congress could violate the First Amendment in
its efforts to regulate broadcasting. The Court explained that had Congress
authorized the FCC “to choose among applicants upon the basis of their political,
economic or social views, or upon any other capricious basis,” then there could be a
constitutional challenge.58
The Court did not go any further to develop how the Communications Act might
run afoul of the First Amendment, since it found “the unique characteristics of radio”
made regulation of the airwaves necessary. “Unlike other modes of expression, radio
inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that is why,
unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental regulation. Because
it cannot be used by all, some who wish to use it must be denied.”59 The Court relied
on the “cannot be used by all”—a precursor of scarcity of the airwaves—to affirm
the general approach of Congress and uphold the statutory framework of granting
broadcasting licenses in the public interest. 60
In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, the issue was whether NBCaffiliated stations could be denied broadcast licenses because their programming was
52. Id.
53. Id. at 853.
54. Id.
55. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
56. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 29, 44 Stat. 1162, 1173, repealed by Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, § 326, 48. Stat. 1064, 1091.
57. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
58. Id. at 226 (“If it did, or if the Commission by these Regulations proposed a choice among
applicants upon some such basis, the issue before us would be wholly different.”).
59. Id.
60. See id. at 226-27.
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distributed as “chain broadcasting.”61 The Communications Act defined “chain
broadcasting” as “simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program by two or more
connected stations.”62 NBC would transmit its content to its owned and affiliated
stations on the Bell System’s leased telephone wires for its stations to air
simultaneously across the country. This was how the networks originally operated.
In 1940, the FCC began a comprehensive effort to review the chain broadcasting
problem and the dominance that RCA’s NBC had established across national
broadcasting.63 NBC operated the Red and Blue networks, with a total of 135
stations. CBS was second in the country with 113 stations.64 Programmatically,
NBC dominated the market with the most popular performers and shows. Only when
the networks began rolling out television was CBS able to become a true competitor
to NBC.65 The NBC alliance also fueled other monopoly concerns, since RCA
“continued to be the world’s largest distributor of radios, which were made by [NBC
co-owners] Westinghouse and General Electric.”66
The dominance of NBC and the growing power of CBS left broadcasters, such
as the Mutual Broadcasting Company, locked out of some geographic markets.
When Mutual had exclusive broadcasting rights to the 1939 baseball World Series,
parts of the country were unable to listen to the broadcast because only NBC and
CBS stations serviced their markets.67 Blocking access to the World Series was too
much for Congress.
The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the FCC regarding the monopoly
concerns of radio licensing.
A licensee station does not operate in the public interest when it enters into exclusive
arrangements which prevent it from giving the public the best service of which it is
capable, and which, by closing the door of opportunity in the network field,
adversely affect the program structure of the entire industry. 68

The result of the decision allowed the FCC to force NBC to divest itself of one
of its networks. It ultimately sold off the Blue Network, which became the American
Broadcast Company (ABC).69 The decision also upheld a series of extensive

61. Id. at 193-94.
62. Id. at 194 n.1 (quoting Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 3(p), 48 Stat. 1064, 1066
(current version at 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2018)).
63. See FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 8 (1941) [hereinafter CHAIN BROADCASTING
REPORT]; see also Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 197 (“The Commission found that at the end of 1938
there were 660 commercial stations in the United States, and that 341 of these were affiliated with
national networks.”).
64. CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 63, at 30.
65. See Radio Chains Ask Court Void FCC License Ruling, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 31, 1941, at 33;
Jon M. Garon, Hidden Hands that Shaped the Marketplace of Ideas: Television’s Early Transformation
from Medium to Genre, 19 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 69 (2016) (“Both NBC and CBS brought
an action to overturn the rule, but smaller broadcasting groups welcomed the FCC efforts to limit NBC
and CBS.”). See generally CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 63, at 21-25.
66. SHIRLEY BIAGI, MEDIA IMPACT: AN INTRODUCTION TO MASS MEDIA 114-15 (10th ed. 2012).
67. Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 198-99.
68. Id. at 199-200 (quoting CHAIN BROADCASTING REPORT, supra note 63, at 52, 57).
69. John C. Abell, Sept. 9, 1926: Radio Sets Up a National Broadcasting Craze, WIRED (Sept. 9,
2010, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2010/09/0909rca-creates-nbc/ [https://perma.cc/Q6HAAGRN] (“RCA tried some fancy footwork—dividing NBC into two companies, NBC (neé Red) and
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regulations regarding ownership, limitations on exclusive ownership provisions, and
other direct controls over the structure of the management of the U.S. broadcast
industry.70
As understood by the Supreme Court in the 1930s and 1940s, the public interest
standard allowed Congress to provide technical controls, ownership controls, antimonopoly controls, and to choose non-renewal of broadcasters who used profane or
vulgar language. Politicians such as President Roosevelt certainly understood the
power of radio and its role as an arm of the press. 71 The Communications Act
prohibited Congress from the kind of censorship that was common for the licensure
of motion pictures.72 But the Commission could still impose its will to deny licenses
to those whose “utterances are vulgar” and not “uplifting or entertaining.”73 The
Commission continued, “[t]hough we may not censor, it is our duty to see that
broadcasting licenses do not afford mere personal organs, and also to see that a
standard of refinement fitting our day and generations is maintained.” 74
In addition, from 1941 through 1949, the FCC’s so-called Mayflower Doctrine75
had the effect of barring broadcasters from “editorializing over their own
facilities.”76 The FCC acknowledged the negative aspects of the Mayflower Doctrine
for purposes of clarifying the actual position of the Commission on content
restrictions of licensees. This was an extension of the 1940 FCC position that “[i]n
carrying out the obligation to render a public service, stations are required to furnish
well-rounded rather than one-sided discussions of public questions.”77
The understanding slowly began to change following World War II. The
Commission on Freedom of the Press used the term “press” to include “all means of
communicating to the public news and opinions, emotions and beliefs, whether by
Blue Network Company—but a 1943 Supreme Court decision did not go its way. So RCA sold Blue
Network for $8 million, and in 1945 the Blue became the American Broadcasting Company (ABC).”);
see National Broadcasting Company, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA,
https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/National_Broadcasting_Company
[https://perma.cc/6K2K-SGNV] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (“In 1939, the FCC ordered RCA to divest
itself of one of the two networks . . . . [Eventually,] RCA sold the NBC Blue Network, Inc. for $8
million to Lifesavers magnate Edward J. Noble in 1943.”).
70. See Nat’l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. at 200-01.
71. See Alexandra Gil, Great Expectations: Content Regulation in Film, Radio, and Television, 6
U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 31, 33 (2009) (“President Franklin Roosevelt called radio ‘a great agent
of public service’ and encouraged the industry to ‘be maintained on an equality of freedom similar to
that freedom that has been, and is, the keystone of the American press.’” (quoting Censorship Plan
Denied by Farley, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1934, at 9)).
72. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 326, 48 Stat. 1064, 1091 (current version at
47 U.S.C. § 326) (“Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the
right of free speech by means of radio communication.”).
73. R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 9 (1959).
74. Id. (citation omitted).
75. Mayflower Broad. Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1940) (“[T]he broadcaster cannot be an
advocate.”).
76. Note, The Mayflower Doctrine Scuttled, 59 YALE L.J. 759, 759 (1950); see VICTOR W.
PICKARD, AMERICA’S BATTLE FOR MEDIA DEMOCRACY: THE TRIUMPH OF CORPORATE
LIBERTARIANISM AND THE FUTURE OF MEDIA REFORM 115-16 (2015).
77. 6 FCC ANN. REP. 55 (1940).
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newspapers, magazine, or books, by radio broadcasts, by television, or by films.” 78
Likely due to the role of broadcasting and movies to maintain public morale during
the war, television, radio, and film were all finally accepted as part of the free speech
ethos of the United States.79
By 1948, the Supreme Court began to recognize a slightly different
understanding of the First Amendment. 80 In yet another case finding that there was
no First Amendment implication regarding antitrust enforcement, the Court noted
the relevance of free speech. “We have no doubt that moving pictures, like
newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the
First Amendment.”81
But the understanding of broadcast regulation continued to focus on the right of
the listening public to receive a broad range of content, not controlled by the
government and not controlled by monopolistic corporate interests. As the
Commission phrased this concern, “[t]he most significant meaning of freedom of the
radio is the right of the American people to listen to this great medium of
communications free from any governmental dictation as to what they can or cannot
hear and free alike from similar restraints by private licensees.”82 The Commission
summarized its understanding of broadcast regulation:
[T]he individual licensees of radio stations have the responsibility for determining
the specific program material to be broadcast over their stations. This choice,
however, must be exercised in a manner consistent with the basic policy of the
Congress that radio be maintained as a medium of free speech for the general public
as a whole rather than as an outlet for the purely personal or private interests of the
licensee.83

In 1959, the Nobel Prize winning British economist Ronald Coase published an
important analysis of the regulation of television and radio by the FCC. 84 Coase
noted that “a commission appointed by the federal government . . . selecting those
who were to be allowed to publish newspapers and periodicals . . . would, of course,
be rejected out of hand as inconsistent with the doctrine of freedom of the press.” 85
A decade following the update to the Mayflower Doctrine, Coase described an
industry that suffered from a great reluctance to editorialize so as to avoid having to
give up airtime or come under attack regarding the renewal of the station’s broadcast
78. THE COMM’N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS: A GENERAL
REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATION 109 (1947); Coase, supra note 73, at 7.
79. See Scott L. Althaus, The Forgotten Role of the Global Newsreel Industry in the Long
Transition from Text to Television, 15 INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 193, 197-99 (2010) (“The newsreel was the
first global news medium . . . .”).
80. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) (“[E]xpression by means of
motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.”).
81. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
82. Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257 (1949).
83. Id. at 1257.
84. See Thomas W. Hazlett et al., Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase, 54
J. L & ECON. S125, S125-26 (2011) (“Coase’s (1959) single paper ‘The Federal Communications
Commission’ has created such a bountiful account balance as to safely capitalize the Economists’ Bank
of Karma for generations to come.”).
85. Coase, supra note 73, at 7.
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license.86
Coase quotes an expert in the field saying that “the most important function of
radio regulation is the allocation of a scarce factor of production – frequency
channels.”87 Despite the numerous examples of the FCC removing problematic
broadcasters and limiting the power of RCA, Coase asserts that the allocation of the
license is “essentially an economic decision not a policing decision.” 88 The
suggestion he proposes, which is not adopted, is to eliminate the public interest
licensing model and replace it with a direct sale of the broadcast licenses to the
public.
C. Speech Regulation through the Fairness Doctrine
Coase’s economic model was not adopted by Congress or the Commission.
Instead, Congress continued to develop rules to promote its goal for the broadcasts
to be managed for the general benefit of the public. Two rules, in particular, came
to define this approach: the fairness doctrine and the right of reply regulations. A
1967 amendment to the Communications Act codified these licensee requirements.
The fairness doctrine obligated broadcasters to provide equal time to all candidates
for public office.89 As part of the right of reply regulations, 90 when a person was
attacked during a broadcast, the licensee was required to send a summary, tape, or
transcript and offer the opportunity to reply, even if the person could not cover the
cost of the airtime.91
In Red Lion Broadcasting Co v. FCC, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine and right of reply regulations, finding that
these rules were constitutional because they “enhance rather than abridge the
freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment.” 92
The Court explained the fairness doctrine had two components. “The
broadcaster must give adequate coverage to public issues, and coverage must be fair
in that it accurately reflects the opposing views.”93 The obligations, of course, ran
much deeper.
When a personal attack has been made on a figure involved in a public issue . . . the
individual attacked himself [must] be offered an opportunity to respond. Likewise,
where one candidate is endorsed in a political editorial, the other candidates must
86. See id.
87. Id. at 14.
88. Id. (quoting Leo Herzel, “Public Interest” and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18
U. OF CHI. L. REV. 802, 809 (1951)).
89. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 315, 48 Stat. 1064, 1088 (current version at 47 U.S.C.
§ 315(a)) (“315. Candidates for public office; facilities; rules. (a) If any licensee shall permit any person
who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford
equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting stations . .
. .”); see also Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public
Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (July 25, 1964); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 371
(1969).
90. See Times-Mirror Broad. Co., 24 P & F Radio Reg. 404 (1962).
91. See Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 371-73.
92. Id. at 375.
93. Id. at 377 (citing United Broad. Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945)); New Broad. Co., 6 P & F Radio
Reg. 258 (1950).
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themselves be offered reply time to use personally or through a spokesman. These
obligations differ from the general fairness requirement . . . . But insofar as there is
an obligation of the broadcaster to see that both sides are presented, and insofar as
that is an affirmative obligation, the personal attack doctrine and regulations do not
differ from the preceding fairness doctrine.94

The Court discussed the legislative history of the public interest doctrine and
found that the right of reply regulations and fairness doctrine were consistently and
expansively endorsed by Congress and the Commission throughout its history. 95
Having found the regulations were consistent with the Communications Act, the
Court turned to the appropriateness of these rules within the context of the First
Amendment.
The Court affirmed the holding of its 1943 decision, National Broadcasting Co.
v. United States, reasserting that the issuance or denial of a station license when “‘the
public interest’ requires it ‘is not a denial of free speech.’”96 The Court also
explained that broadcast was different than other media:
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put
restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this
unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the
ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.97

The Court dismissed as speculative the concern that the fairness doctrine and
right of reply regulations discouraged licensees from airing content that could trigger
an unwanted reply.98 The Court noted approvingly that “the Commission for 40
years has been choosing licensees based in part on their program proposals.”99 The
Court also dismissed the technological innovations that seemed to be making the
scarcity of broadcast airwaves a thing of the past. 100
In assessing the continuation of the broadcasting jurisprudence, there is certainly
an argument that even by 1969, the changes in broadcasting were not sufficient to
overturn forty years of stability in radio and television, or that changes to the First
Amendment jurisprudence in areas such as defamation law101 or privacy102
necessarily expanded the application of the First Amendment to broadcast. At the
same time, the Court understood that the interpretation of the First Amendment was
beginning to change.103 The Court acknowledged the vigorous debate in the legal

94. Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 378.
95. Id. at 385-86.
96. Id. at 389 (quoting NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943)).
97. Id. at 390.
98. Id. at 393 (“[B]roadcasters will be irresistibly forced to self-censorship and their coverage of
controversial public issues will be eliminated or at least rendered wholly ineffective . . . . At this point,
however, as the Federal Communications Commission has indicated, that possibility is at best
speculative.”).
99. Id. at 394.
100. Id. at 396-97.
101. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
102. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
103. Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 386.
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literature regarding the argument that the First Amendment can be protected by
allowing the government to regulate speech rather than allowing the marketplace to
determine the efficacy of speech.104
The unique regulation of broadcast was highlighted by Florida’s effort to
enforce a right of reply statute for newspapers. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, the Supreme Court utterly rejected the applicability of Red Lion to print
media.105 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court continued to enforce the public interest
approach to the First Amendment for broadcast.106 The specific requirements of the
fairness doctrine took nearly two more decades to be finally put to rest.107 The FCC
itself determined that the fairness doctrine chilled speech, metastasizing into “a
pervasive and significant impediment to the broadcasting of controversial issues of
public importance.”108
D. Continued Regulation Beyond the Fairness Doctrine
The Supreme Court has continued to permit regulation of broadcast television
and radio to different standards than those of other media.109 In Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner I),110 the Court again noted the distinction between
broadcast radio and television from the regulation of the cable industry. 111 Since the
focus of the case was the level of First Amendment scrutiny appropriate to regulation
governing the cable industry, the Court declined to address the relevance of the
scarcity doctrine.112 The Court reviewed the must-carry provisions of the Cable Act
104. Id. (“The general problems raised by a technology which supplants atomized, relatively
informal communication with mass media as a prime source of national cohesion and news were
discussed at considerable length by Zechariah Chafee in Government and Mass Communications
(1947).”).
105. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
106. See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (upholding broadcasters’ obligations to provide
time for national political candidates upheld).
107. See Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Reguls. Concerning the Gen.
Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 142, 169 (1985), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 809 F.2d 860 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter 1985
Fairness Report]. See generally Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station
WTVH Syracuse, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043 (1987) (providing a
comprehensive review of the fairness doctrine and determining “the fairness doctrine chills speech and
is not narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial government interest. We therefore conclude, under
existing Supreme Court precedent, as set forth in Red Lion and its progeny, that the fairness doctrine
contravenes the First Amendment and thereby disserves the public interest.”).
108. 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 107, at 169 para 42; Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867
F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he FCC’s decision that the fairness doctrine no longer served the
public interest was neither arbitrary, capricious nor an abuse of discretion, and are convinced that it
would have acted on that finding to terminate the doctrine even in the absence of its belief that the
doctrine was no longer constitutional.”).
109. See generally FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
110. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 645.
111. Id. at 637 (“[T]he rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny
to broadcast regulation, whatever its validity in the cases elaborating it, does not apply in the context of
cable regulation.”).
112. Id. at 638-39 (“Although courts and commentators have criticized the scarcity rationale since its
inception, we have declined to question its continuing validity as support for our broadcast
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and ultimately remanded after establishing that “the appropriate standard by which
to evaluate the constitutionality of must-carry is the intermediate level of scrutiny
applicable to content-neutral restrictions that impose an incidental burden on
speech.”113
In an important reassessment of the case following its remand, the Supreme
Court upheld the must carry provisions as meeting the intermediate scrutiny standard
of United States v. O’Brien.114 The Court found that the three goals of the mustcarry provisions were to further important governmental interests: “(1) preserving
the benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the
widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3)
promoting fair competition in the market for television programming.”115
Unlike the vague demands of the public interest standards underlying the
Communications Act, the goals of continuing free access to public news,
entertainment, and educational information provides a very clear goal for Congress
and administrative regulators. The goal to maintain a multiplicity of sources remains
essentially the same goal that drove the original Radio Act and shaped the Chain
Broadcasting prohibitions. Promoting fair competition is a standard much more open
to interpretation, but in the remand of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC
(Turner II), the question was not whether such a standard could be upheld, but
whether there was a sufficiently demonstrated governmental need to support the
must-carry rules as a way to promote the multiplicity of news and information
sources.
With regard to the third goal, promoting fair competition for television, the
Court found little difficulty in upholding the efforts of Congress. “[T]he
Government’s interest in eliminating restraints on fair competition is always
substantial, even when the individuals or entities subject to particular regulations are
engaged in expressive activity protected by the First Amendment.”116
In concurrence, Justice Breyer emphasized an aspect of the must-carry
provisions that received only minimal attention from the majority.
[The statute] undoubtedly seeks to provide over-the-air viewers who lack cable
with a rich mix of over-the-air programming by guaranteeing the over-the-air
stations that provide such programming with the extra dollars that an additional
cable audience will generate. I believe that this purpose—to assure the over-the-air
public “access to a multiplicity of information sources,”—provides sufficient basis
for rejecting appellants’ First Amendment claim.117

Thus, Justice Breyer emphasized the second public interest goal of Congress.
jurisprudence, and see no reason to do so here. . . . [C]able television does not suffer from the inherent
limitations that characterize the broadcast medium.” (internal citation omitted)).
113. Id. at 662 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)); United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
114. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (“A content-neutral
regulation will be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances important governmental interests
unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than
necessary to further those interests.”).
115. Id. at 189.
116. Id. at 190 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664).
117. Id. at 226 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 663).
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The majority was specific, if not as voluble, as the concurrence regarding the
importance of this goal. The Court said, “assuring that the public has access to a
multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order,
for it promotes values central to the First Amendment.”118 The Turner II Court
rejected arguments that this goal could be satisfied by assuring a minimum number
of broadcasters.119
The ability for Congress to continue to address the concerns regarding those
listeners and viewers who lack access to paid content services from cable systems
remains a growing concern. As such, the transition from a First Amendment
jurisprudential model with no meaningful oversight to a system requiring content
neutral regulations that further the government interest should not impose burdens
too high for the government to overcome.
III. THE MOVE TO DIGITAL DISTRIBUTION
At first glance, the history of radio and television regulations may have little
relevance to the transformation of media in the Internet Age. However, television
and radio companies remain dominant as media producers and distributors, so the
potential for them to be disconnected with mainstream media could have far-reaching
implications. The FCC’s broadcast media policy provides the scaffolding against
which cable, satellite and Internet content distribution is structured.
Traditional broadcasters CBS, NBC, and ABC were founded during the age of
radio regulation.120 Fox was the only successful network launched during the age of
television regulation.121 There are a multiplicity of cable “networks,” which are
services providing programming on one or more cable channels. 122 The four major
network-owned or affiliated stations, however, account for approximately eighty
percent of the television broadcasters. The remaining broadcasters are comprised of
noncommercial stations, independent stations, and stations affiliated with smaller
networks with specialty program, such as Spanish language content. 123
Although it was not the first online streaming media service, when Netflix
118. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 663; Turner II, 520 U.S. at 190.
119. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 191-92.
120. See Harold L. Erickson, CBS Corporation, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/topic/CBS-Corporation [https://perma.cc/T2EX-7MBF] (last visited Dec. 17, 2020)
(formed in 1927 and launched in 1929 when Columbia Phonograph and Records Co. was purchased by
William S. Paley to help promote sales of La Palina cigars, owned by Paley’s father); see also Garon,
Hidden Hands, supra note 65, at 69 (discussing NBC v. U.S. and requirement of RCA’s divestment of
the Blue network).
121. 1 THOMAS D. SELZ ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS
PRACTICES § 1:21 (2019) (“In 1986, the Fox Broadcasting Company grew out of six television stations
owned by the Fox Television Stations Group and 90 independent broadcasters that became affiliates of a
fourth national broadcast network, the Fox Broadcasting Company.”). Paramount’s UPN,
TimeWarner’s WB and its successor CW, which was a joint effort of CBS and TimeWarner, were never
able to establish their programming as broadcast networks.
122. See, e.g., Cable Television, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/media/engineering/cable-television
[https://perma.cc/QNU4-GYQ5] (Dec. 15, 2015).
123. JOSEPH TUROW, MEDIA TODAY: MASS COMMUNICATION IN A CONVERGING WORLD 391-92
(6th ed. 2017) (“[T]here are also more than a couple dozen smaller advertising-supported networks in
English or Spanish that local stations contract to carry on extra digital signals that they send out . . . .
Examples are Me-TV and Antenna TV.”).
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switched from a DVD-by-mail service to a streaming service, it heralded in a new
era in film and television content distribution. 124 Unlike Hulu, which continues to
be owned by various traditional media conglomerates, 125 Netflix represented a
media competitor without any ties to the broadcast industry.126
The gravitational center of traditional television is shifting from the
broadcaster—as delivered through cable systems—to the online, “over-the-top”
(OTT or streaming) media services. 127 “18 to 34-year-olds spent just 25% of their
media consuming time with the TV, compared to 58% on connected devices.”128 The
trends are beginning to impact older viewers as well. “[O]lder audiences globally
also are jumping on the OTT bandwagon, with 42% of consumers 45-54 years old
having at least one [subscription video on demand (SVOD)] in 2016, up from 25%
a year earlier. In 2017, nearly one-third of consumers 55+ subscribed to a video
service, up from 19% in 2016.”129
By 2019, the expansion of streaming services was even more pronounced:
A special survey into U.S. consumer sentiment toward streaming platforms . . .
found that 91% of all respondents and a whopping 96% of respondents 18-34
subscribe to a paid streaming video service. Beyond that, there is still room to
expand the number and variety of services, as nearly one-third of all respondents
and almost half (47%) of respondents 18-34 say they currently subscribe to three or
more paid services.130

Consumers are increasingly turning to streaming content first and to live
television as a supplement, which is a fundamental restructuring of the relationship
between the content producers and the public. “Subscription and ad-supported OTT
services are steadily replacing traditional content delivery and there’s no end to the
opportunity to create connections with a global audience. OTT is not traditional
TV.”131

124. See THE NETFLIX EFFECT: TECHNOLOGY AND ENTERTAINMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 139-40
(Kevin McDonald & Daniel Smith-Rowsey eds., 2016) (“In redefining how we see, experience, and
interact with cinema and television, Netflix raises an array of considerations about how we project an
innovative cinematic vision for the future of viewing . . . media.”); GINA KEATING, NETFLIXED: THE
EPIC BATTLE FOR AMERICA’S EYEBALLS 225 (2012).
125. Kirsten Korosec, Hulu Buys Back AT&T’s Minority Stake in Streaming Service Now Valued at
$15 Billion, TECH CRUNCH (Apr. 15, 2019, 6:28 PM), https://www.fcc.gov/media/engineering/cabletelevision [https://perma.cc/Y2BY-UPDS].
126. JIM O’NEILL, STATE OF THE BROADCAST INDUSTRY 2019: BROADCASTERS AND OTT: IT’S ALL
IN THE FAMILY 1 (Ooyala 2019), http://go.ooyala.com/rs/447-EQK-225/images/Ooyala-State-Of-TheBroadcast-Industry-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8ZG-CQSU] (“Netflix’s move into streaming video on
demand was met with a shrug of shoulders and, occasionally, outright dismissal.”). See generally
KEATING, supra note 124, at 225.
127. Sahil Patel, WTF is OTT?, DIGIDAY (July 7, 2015), https://digiday.com/media/what-is-over-thetop-ott/ [https://perma.cc/M4PN-S2WZ] (“OTT stands for ‘over-the-top,’ the term used for the delivery
of film and TV content via the internet, without requiring users to subscribe to a traditional cable or
satellite pay-TV service like a Comcast or Time Warner Cable.”).
128. O’NEILL, supra note 126, at 2.
129. Id.
130. NIELSEN CO., THE NIELSEN TOTAL AUDIENCE REPORT: FEBRUARY 2020, at 5 (2020), https://
go.nielsen.com/totalaudience/report/2020/feb/ [https://perma.cc/2ZB9-S58S].
131. O’Neill, supra note 126, at 4.
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There is also more than viewer preference driving the transformation.
According to Nielsen Co., “time and money—not interest—are the limiting factors.
Nearly two-thirds cited the overall cost of media services, while 40% admitted there
is only so much content they currently have time to consume.” 132 While digital
advertising is growing, television advertising payments are evidencing a steady
decline.133 Unlike the advertising buy on television which is distributed to all
viewers, digital advertising can be tailored to specific audience targets. 134 While
some OTT services such as Netflix and Amazon Prime are ad-free, others are not.
For advertiser-funded OTT, the distributors have the ability to provide television
with segmented advertising.135
Advertisers have a strong incentive to direct their content at the consumers most
likely to respond to their ads. Yet seventy-four percent of the public surveyed said
they find the television commercials irrelevant. 136 Advertisers hate the waste, and
they hope the public will be more willing to watch relevant ads. 137 “The stitching
together of digital audiences with TV audiences opens up the market to become more
fluid for marketers looking to target consumers beyond the typical Nielsen age, sex
demos.”138
If addressable advertising drives advertisers to shift their investment in OTT
rather than in broadcast content, the financial support for broadcasting will erode.
Faced with consumer flight to the OTT platforms and advertiser flight driven by
addressable advertising and the consumption shift, the economic viability of
broadcast could soon hit a tipping point. 139 Once that happens, most content would
More than 76% of America’s 128 million broadband households take at least one major
streaming service—Netflix, Amazon or Hulu . . . . Another 8% take a virtual pay-TV
service like YouTube TV or DirecTV Now. A Deloitte study found the average streaming
household subscribes to three services, and that doesn’t include ad-supported services.
Id.
132. NIELSEN CO., supra note 130, at 8.
133. Id. (“National TV ad sales peaked in 2016, when they exceeded $43 billion, according to data
from Magna, the ad-buying and media intelligence arm of IPG Mediabrands. Sales fell 2.2 percent last
year, and the firm estimates that they will fall at least 2 percent each year through 2022.”).
134. Id. (“Companies love digital advertising because it gives them the ability to target ads based on
their own lists of customers—like holders of store loyalty cards—and profiles like ‘first-time car buyers’
or ‘people who like foreign travel.’”).
135. See Edward C. Malthouse et al., Understanding Programmatic TV Advertising, 35 INT’L J.
ADVERT. 769, 773 (2018).
There are two different, and increasingly competing, approaches to buying/selling
advertising media. The mass approach is characterized by media companies selling mass
audiences through a sales force to advertisers who inform their decisions with probability
samples such as Nielsen panel data. The computational advertising approach is marked by
purchasing individual exposures informed by whatever data may be available about the
device, cookie, household, etc.
Id. at 769.
136. Alan Wolk, Television is Embracing Audience Segmentation as Addressable OTT Continues to
Explode, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2018, 10:43 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/alanwolk/2018/08/06/television-is-embracing-audience-segmentation-asaddressable-ott-continue-to-explode/#380f81f85c12 [https://perma.cc/LYG6-ZQ6C].
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. The third factor disrupting broadcast and cable is the availability of 5G or faster wireless. This
technology is anticipated to roll out over the next 2–3 years. See Todd Haselton, The Way You Get TV
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be originated for OTT and the infrastructure for broadcasting would be discarded.
Congress may receive significant pressure to eventually auction off the broadcast
spectrum that it has managed on behalf of the public for radio and television
broadcast.
IV. FCC BACKS OFF OWNERSHIP RULES BUT RETAINS PUBLIC INTEREST GOALS
FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING AND CHILDREN’S PROGRAMMING
To many, the shift to OTT content distribution is an inevitable and welcome
change. Nonetheless, the FCC remains a significant influence on broadcast content,
and without the use of the scarce broadcast spectrum, these regulations could cease
to exist.140 The scope of the regulation is a mere shadow of the FCC’s control of
radio and television in its early years. The rules barring common ownership of
television and newspaper stations in the same market were eliminated in 2017. 141
The change allowed Sinclair Broadcast Group to acquire Tribune Media through
a merger that significantly increased Sinclair’s national reach.142 Sinclair distributes
the same content to all its stations, highlighting concerns first raised during debates
on the Radio Act that national operators would fail to support local journalism or be
mindful of local interests.143 The two dissenting members of the Commission raised
concerns that the change undermines access to local news coverage. 144 The New
York Times quoted Democratic Commissioner Mignon Clyburn, “who voted against
the orders,” as saying that “[d]uring the first 10 months of 2017, the [FCC] majority
has given the green light to more than a dozen actions that are a direct attack on
consumers and small businesses.”145
Although television ownership rules have been significantly relaxed, they have
not yet been eliminated. The television ownership rules operate to keep a network
from owning stations that reach more than thirty-nine percent of the U.S. TV

and Internet at Home is about to Change Drastically – for the Better, CNBC (Aug. 15, 2018, 5:26 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/alanwolk/2018/08/06/television-is-embracing-audience-segmentation-asaddressable-ott-continue-to-explode/#380f81f85c12 [https://perma.cc/A5DD-3KWU] (“The current
wireless standard . . . is fast but not quite fast enough for an entire house of people to play games and
stream 4K movies at the same time . . . . The technology for 5G is fast enough for that, and you can
forget the cords.”).
140. The FCC also has regulations related to efforts to promote diversity in the media workforce.
See Christina Shu Jien Chong, Back to the Drawing Board! Legislating Hollywood: A Regulation that
Resolves the Film Industry’s Conflict Between the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 35 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 605, 611-14 (2019) (raising public interest claims regarding employment and anti-discrimination).
141. See 2014 Quadrennial Regul. Rev.—Rev. of the Comm’n’s Broad. Ownership Rules & Other
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Order on Reconsideration and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 32 FCC Rcd. 9802, 9806-24 (2017) [hereinafter Order on
Reconsideration]; Rules and Policies to Promote New Entry and Ownership Diversity in Broadcasting
Services, 83 Fed. Reg. 774 (proposed Jan. 8, 2018) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
142. See Cecilia Kang, F.C.C. Opens Door to Increased Consolidation in TV Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2017, at B2.
143. See id.; see also John Samples, Broadcast Localism and the Lessons of the Fairness Doctrine,
POLICY ANALYSIS, no. 639, May 27, 2009, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa639.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24S2-WDBC].
144. Kang, supra note 142.
145. Id.
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households to effectively bar a merger among ABC, CBS, Fox, and NBC.146 This
rule is no longer designed to protect the diversity of viewpoint and content in any
particular television market, but instead to slow the consolidation of the media
industry.147
Despite political criticism, there has been no significant movement to eliminate
the separate existence of the Corporation of Public Broadcasting and the regulations
that allow for special set-asides and regulations for noncommercial broadcasting. 148
Given the scarcity of broadcast spectrum, setting aside broadcast licenses for
noncommercial broadcasters is a form of content regulation, but it is also a
congressional statement about public interest priorities. The Public Broadcasting
Act was passed in 1967 in furtherance of that public interest.149 Public Broadcasting
furthers the general welfare to encourage public telecommunications services which
will be responsive to the interests of people both in particular localities and
throughout the United States, which will constitute an expression of diversity and
excellence, and which will constitute a source of alternative telecommunications
services for all the citizens of the Nation.150

Similar to the must-carry rules for cable systems, the congressional mandate to
set aside broadcast spectrum for this purpose is an appropriate solution to address
the substantial governmental interest.151
Another area where the Commission has not completely deregulated the
broadcast marketplace involves children’s television. In 1990, Congress passed the
Children’s Television Act (CTA), mandating at least three hours of educational
children’s television programming and limiting the advertisements offered during

146. FCC Broadcast Ownership Rules, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/fccs-reviewbroadcast-ownership-rules [https://perma.cc/5SCX-46C2] (Jan. 17, 2020).
147. See Gerard Daley, Column: Closing Argument Fight the Entertainment Industry Cartel, 23 L.A.
LAW. 68, 68 (2000).
When the Media Monopoly, Ben Bagdikian’s classic vivisection of the media industry’s
power relations, was published in 1983, the number of corporations that effectively
controlled publishing, print journalism, film production and distribution, music, radio,
television, and eventually the Internet was about 50. When his book went into its fifth
edition in 1997 that number had dwindled to 10. In light of the recent Viacom-CBS
nuptials, a sixth edition is sorely needed: the cartel’s membership today is down to about
five.
Id. at 68.
148. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a)-(b), 394, 396, 399a, 399b (2018); 47 C.F.R. § 73.503 (2020); see
also Jonathan M. Phillips, Freedom by Design: Objective Analysis and the Constitutional Status of
Public Broadcasting, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 991, 992 (2007) (“[T]he interplay between governance and
programming content choices raises salient First Amendment issues of editorial autonomy and
independence from government influence.”)
149. See Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. §§ 390-397, 609).
150. Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 § 201(9) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(5)).
151. See Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 736 F.3d 1192, 1201-04 (9th Cir. 2013) (The
regulations of the Public Broadcasting Act were “designed to further the important governmental
interest in preserving the essentially noncommercial nature of public broadcasting within a minimal
regulatory framework by insulating public broadcasters from commercial marketplace pressures and
decisions.” (quoting Comm’n Pol’y Concerning the Noncom. Nature of Educ. Broad. Stations, 90
F.C.C.2d 895, 896 (1982))).
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those broadcasts.152
Although there was originally great skepticism regarding the need for the
CTA,153 the commitment to children’s broadcast content dropped significantly in the
1980s. Television shows like Captain Kangaroo disappeared from the morning
schedule,154 and overall hours of production “dropped from 11 per week in 1980”
down to “fewer than two per week in 1990.”155 Following the adoption of the statute,
the FCC issued comprehensive regulations to define educational and informational
programming and set the minimums for broadcaster compliance. 156 Although the
policies are complex and allow for a number of exceptions, the general obligation
requires each broadcaster provide three hours of “[c]ore [p]rogramming” to serve
“the educational and informational needs of children 16 years of age and under.” 157
Somewhat surprisingly, despite the massive deregulation by the FCC, these
rules are being adjusted only modestly. 158 Under the 2019 rules, the core
programming requirement will expand to start at 6:00 a.m. rather than 7:00 a.m.,
permit expanded use of educational specials, and permit more short-form content.159
The obligation to maintain 156 hours of core children’s programming annually
remains in place.160 One of the important findings of the Commission focuses on the
impact of poverty and access disparity to broadcast regulations. The Commission
recognized that new media alternatives are not universally available equally to all
members of the public:
Nevertheless, while it is clear that the media landscape has evolved dramatically
since the children’s programming rules were adopted, we recognize that not all
children, particularly children in minority and low-income households, have access
to the wealth of children’s educational programming available on non-broadcast
platforms. Nielsen data indicate that as of May 2018, more than 14% of television
households in the U.S. (over 16 million households) are over-the-air households

152. See Children’s Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996; Minority Television
Project, Inc., 736 F.3d at 1201; Joel Timmer, Changes in the Children’s Television Marketplace, the
Children’s Television Act, and the First Amendment, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 731, 739 (2019)
(“[B]roadcasters are not required to air three hours of core programming per week; however, those that
do simply have the certainty that the CTA portion of their license renewal would be routinely
approved.”).
153. See Child.’s Television Programming & Advert. Pracs., Report and Order 96 F.C.C.2d 634,
647-48 para 32 (1984).
154. See Regulations on Children’s Television Programming in the United States, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulations_on_children%27s_television_programming_in_the_United_S
tates [https://perma.cc/9MDL-27CM] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (“In 1982, the Reagan administration’s
FCC chairman Mark S. Fowler lamented upon CBS’s decision to move its long-running children’s
series Captain Kangaroo . . . to weekends, in order to accommodate an expanded morning newscast.
CBS had already shortened the program from a full hour to 30 minutes in 1981 . . . .”).
155. Timmer, supra note 152, at 736 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-66, at 1 (1989)).
156. Pol’ys & Rules Concerning Child.’s Television Programming, Report and Order 11 FCC Rcd.
10660, 10662-63 para. 5 (1996).
157. 47 C.F.R. § 73.671(c) (2020).
158. See generally Children’s Television Programming Rules; Modernization of Media Regulation
Initiative, 84 Fed. Reg. 41917 (Aug. 16, 2019) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
159. Id. at 41921
160. Id. at 41922.
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(i.e., they do not subscribe to cable or satellite television).161

The statutory authority and regulatory implementation of public broadcasting
set-asides continue to be judged using the intermediate scrutiny standard articulated
in O’Brien.162 Given the substantial public interest of Congress in providing access
to educational and cultural content to members of the public, including a significant
population who may not be able to afford purchasing non-broadcast access, these
regulations are likely to continue to be upheld under intermediate scrutiny. The
children’s programming rules have not been challenged in court, and the
Commission seems well within its mandate “to strike a balance between our interest
in modernizing our rules to reflect the growth in the amount of children's educational
programming available on broadcast . . . with the reality that some children in
minority and low-income households still rely on live, over-the-air broadcast
television.”163
V. THE LIKELY DEMISE OF INDECENCY REGULATION
Explicit content regulation is another area for which the FCC has famously
attempted to regulate the air. Presently, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 provides that “[w]hoever
utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication
shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” 164 The FCC had
been enforcing various versions of the indecency standard since the adoption of the
Radio Act,165 but the Commission formalized the standard in response to the
increasing significance of the First Amendment over the decades.166 The FCC has
used license authority and pressure on the broadcasters, but has not often involved
the criminal provisions until urged by Congress to do so. 167 The Supreme Court
upheld the indecency policy in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,168 but has since avoided

161. Id. at 41921.
162. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (striking down ban on
editorializing); Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 736 F.3d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 2013)
(upholding ban on advertising on public television stations).
163. Children’s Television Programming Rules; Modernization of Media Regulation Initiative, 84
Fed. Reg. at 41921.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2018); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 243 (2012).
165. See, e.g., Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932);
Angela J. Campbell, Pacifica Reconsidered: Implications for the Current Controversy over Broadcast
Indecency, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 198 (2010) (“Both § 1464 of the Criminal Code and section 326 of
the Communications Act originated in the Radio Act of 1927. . . .”); Lili Levi, “Smut and Nothing but”:
The FCC, Indecency, and Regulatory Transformations in the Shadows, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 509, 520
(2013) (“NBC’s banning of Mae West from the air for a suggestive reading of a radio skit [on the Edgar
Bergen show, playing Eve in the Garden of Eden] indicates that such informal reprimands were
sufficient to maintain decorum on the air.” (citing Steve Craig, Out of Eden: The Legion of Decency, the
FCC, and Mae West’s 1937 Appearance on The Chase & Sanborn Hour, 13 J. RADIO STUD. 232 (2006)
as background information)).
166. See Indus. Guidance on the Comm’n’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C § 1464 & Enf’t Pol’ys
Regarding Broad. Indecency, Policy Statement, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8000 para. 4 (2001).
167. See Campbell, supra note 165, at 199 (“In practice, neither the DOJ nor the FCC actively
enforced § 1464 prior to 1970. In 1969, the Senate Subcommittee on Communications held a hearing
and strongly suggested that the FCC do more to curb offensive broadcasting.”).
168. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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either reaffirming that decision or rejecting the standard. 169
Outside of the broadcast context, however, the Supreme Court has been quite
strident in rejecting indecency regulations. Early efforts by Congress to tame the
indecent, vulgar, and pornographic content on the Internet were met with little
success. Congress began its efforts to reign in the Internet with the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 (CDA).170 In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the
Supreme Court struck down portions of the CDA “enacted to protect minors from
‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’ communications on the Internet.” 171 The Court
found that the statute was neither narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest nor did it offer the least restrictive alternative to its goals,
however compelling they might have been.172
The Court rejected the second effort of Congress to regulate minors’ access to
indecent online speech in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union.173 The
Supreme Court made the point very clear that “[c]ontent-based prohibitions,
enforced by severe criminal penalties, have the constant potential to be a repressive
force in the lives and thoughts of a free people. To guard against that threat the
Constitution demands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed
invalid.”174
More recently, in Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court struck down the regulations
of the Patent and Trademark Office to deny trademark registration for any mark that
may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living
or dead.”175 Although there is a distinction between the government’s interest in
preventing speech that offends because of its message—as framed in Tam—instead
of its vulgarity, as understood in Pacifica, the governmental interest seems very
similar.
The distinction became even smaller when the Supreme Court followed Tam
with Iancu v. Brunetti.176 Here, the Supreme Court struck down another of the
Trademark Act’s “prohibitions on registration—one applying to marks that
‘[c]onsist[ ] of or comprise[ ] immoral[ ] or scandalous matter.’” 177 The test for the
Patent and Trademark Office turned on the examiner’s understanding whether the
term was disgraceful, offensive, disreputable, or vulgar.178 It is very hard to
169. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 258 (2012) (“[B]ecause the Court resolves
these cases on fair notice grounds under the Due Process Clause, it need not address the First
Amendment implications of the Commission’s indecency policy.”).
170. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 501-561, 110 Stat. 133, 133143.
171. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 906 (1997).
172. Id. at 879 (“The breadth of this content-based restriction of speech imposes an especially heavy
burden on the Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective as the
CDA. It has not done so.”).
173. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 659 (2004).
174. Id. at 660. While other decisions distinguish between restrictions on obscene material that lies
outside the scope of First Amendment protection and indecent or pornographic material that retains such
protection, obscenity is quite narrowly drawn. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124
(1989) (“The protection of the First Amendment does not extend to obscene speech.”).
175. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)).
176. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
177. Id. at 2298.
178. Id. The larger list of offensive synonyms is described by the Court:
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distinguish this standard from the indecency standard of Pacifica. This is even more
obvious since the trademark denied registration was the word “Fuct.” 179
For OTT, the modality of the television content is distributed on the Internet.
Congress did not place much effort in controlling obscenity or indecency on the
Internet,180 but instead focused its efforts on protecting children from harmful
speech. In the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 181 Congress tried to provide a
narrowly tailored protection for minors against content “harmful to minors.” 182
Congress could not, however, demonstrate that the statute represented the least
restrictive means to accomplish the congressional goal. Ultimately, Congress could
not draft a sufficiently narrow statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 183
As these free speech cases suggest, the indecency regulation of the FCC will
likely end with the demise of over-the-air broadcasting. It is possible that these
regulations will end much earlier because the increasingly insignificant market share
of broadcast makes the enforcement somewhat arbitrary. 184 Furthermore, Iancu v.
Brunetti cast any remaining legitimacy of Pacifica into grave doubt. Given the
difficultly faced by the FCC in crafting a sufficiently narrow regulation in FCC v.
Fox, indecency regulation may be a thing of the past. 185

To determine whether a mark fits in the category, the PTO asks whether a “substantial
composite of the general public” would find the mark “shocking to the sense of truth,
decency, or propriety”; “giving offense to the conscience or moral feelings”; “calling out
for condemnation”; “disgraceful”; “offensive”; “disreputable”; or “vulgar.”
Id.
179. Id. at 2297 (“Respondent Erik Brunetti is an artist and entrepreneur who founded a clothing line
that uses the trademark FUCT.”).
180. See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133.
This statute was immediately struck down as unconstitutional. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
181. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 231,112 Stat. 2681, 2861736 to -739
(1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231).
182. Child Online Protection Act § 231(e)(6) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6)).
Material that is “harmful to minors” is defined as:
any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other
matter of any kind that is obscene or that—
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking
the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed
to pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors,
an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or
perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast;
and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.
Id.
183. ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 207 (3d Cir. 2008) (“It is apparent that COPA, like the
Communications Decency Act before it, ‘effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults
have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another,’. . . and thus is overbroad.” (quoting
Reno, 521 U.S. at 874)).
184. See, e.g., Maria Fontenot & Michael T. Martinez, FCC’s Indecency Regulation: A Comparative
Analysis of Broadcast and Online Media, 26 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 59, 64 (2019) (considering FCC v.
Fox); L.A. Powe, Jr., Red Lion and Pacifica: Are They Relics? 36 PEPP. L. REV. 445, 452-53 (2009).
185. See Barton Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Immoral or Scandalous Marks: An Empirical Analysis,
8 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 169, 199-200 (2019).
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VI. THE NEED FOR CONTENT NEUTRAL REGULATIONS OF THE MARKETPLACE
The Internet has not proved to be the utopian media platform some hoped it
would become.186 Tim Berners-Lee, one of the pioneers of the World Wide Web,
“understood how the epic power of the Web would radically transform governments,
businesses, [and] societies. He also envisioned that his invention could, in the wrong
hands, become a destroyer of world[s] . . . .”187 Much like the radio of the early
twentieth century, the various platforms are filled with both high quality fare and the
vulgar and profane.188
Nonetheless, as established by Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, and Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties
Union, the Supreme Court has limited congressional oversight of content to the
obscene material that is outside the scope of First Amendment protection. This
article does not suggest that Congress should continue any efforts at limiting access
to constitutionally protected speech, even for minors.
Nonetheless, there remain substantial and compelling interests at stake in a
lightly regulated media environment on the Internet. Primarily, these interests fall
into three categories. First, there is a compelling need to continue free access to
news, educational, and cultural programming for the economically disadvantaged.
Second, there is a need to assure that all members of the public are afforded equal
access to the content provided by media providers, and to prohibit “digital redlining”
of public accommodations to enforce civil rights laws. And third, there is a
compelling government interest in the privacy of its citizens to regulate the tracking
and surveillance of the public. Each of these interests is content neutral and can be
accomplished in manners that place little or no burden on lawful speech.
In addition, the government has a compelling interest in promoting a diversity
of viewpoint; upholding free and fair elections; enforcing constitutionally permitted
defamation actions; and in punishing criminal and fraudulent conduct committed
186. See Bill Wasik, The Internet Dream Became a Nightmare?, N.Y. TIMES MAG (Nov. 13, 2019),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/13/magazine/internet-future.html [https://perma.cc/CB36475T] (“Having built a machine to connect the world and let everyone have a say—thereby giving rise
to a new social reality in which, . . . ‘people no longer have to rely on traditional gatekeepers in politics
or media to make their voices heard’—Facebook now had to concede that there was no foolproof way to
stop those voices from saying things that were unfactual or malevolent, or to stop their friends and
followers from believing them.” (quoting Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg)); Noah Kulwin, The
Internet Apologizes..., N.Y. MAG., http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/04/an-apology-for-the-internetfrom-the-people-who-built-it.html [https://perma.cc/HWH6-QL8R] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020)
(“[P]rogrammers and investors and CEOs [have made] clear” that the business model is what turned
“the Silicon Valley dream of building a networked utopia . . . into a globalized strip-mall casino overrun
by pop-up ads and cyberbullies and Vladimir Putin.”). See generally SIMON LINDGREN, DIGITAL
MEDIA AND SOCIETY (2017).
187. Katrina Booker, “I Was Devastated”: Tim Berners–Lee, The Man Who Created the World
Wide Web, Has Some Regrets, VANITY FAIR (July 1, 2018),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2018/07/the-man-who-created-the-world-wide-web-has-some-regrets
[https://perma.cc/9HAN-FVMR].
188. See Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital
Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435 (2011); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The
Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty?, 5 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 423, 431 (1998) (“In the twentieth
century, fascist and totalitarian governments attempted to determine the information that reached their
citizens by controlling print, radio, and television media.”).
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through speech. These goals, however, are content based, making any narrow
tailoring of these efforts extremely challenging. Nonetheless, since the public is
served best if these goals are met, regulatory efforts may be justified.
A. Public Access to Narrow the Digital Divide
Public access to telecommunications has been a fundamental part of the U.S.
communications policy since its early inception. The 1934 Communications Act
included an obligation to “make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the
United States . . . a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges.”189 While
ubiquitous, 10% of the U.S. public still did not use the Internet in 2019.190 Although
that number has dropped from 48% when the Pew Research Center began its study
in 2000,191 there is still a significant population not being served.
The population not using the Internet is older and poorer. Twenty-seven percent
of adults over 65 do not use the Internet, compared with just 3% of those between
30-49.192 But even among adults age 50-64, the number of non-users is 12%.193
Equally important, for those with incomes under $30,000, the percentage of all adults
who do not use the internet is 18%.194 In addition, to use the new media services,
usage requires more than the Internet. The user must have a broadband connection
or sufficiently robust service that it can support video streaming or downloading.
Penetration of Internet and broadband are not reaching the entire republic,
emphasizing economic, age, geographic, and racial disparities.195 Price continues to
be a significant barrier to broadband access, and in order “to achieve a 10% increase
in broadband subscribership, an average price decrease of approximately 15% is
needed.”196 In addition, there are related barriers to broadband adoption. These may
include “factors such as lack of skills to use the technology, lack of computer or
device, and lack of relevance of the online experience.” 197
In addition, the cost for content is added on top of the cost for Internet access.
Netflix, Disney+, CBS All Access, and most of the new media platforms are behind
financial paywalls, requiring monthly or annual fees. 198 Since 76% of newspapers

189. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (current version at 47 U.S.C. §
151 (2018)).
190. Monica Anderson et al., 10% of Americans Don’t Use the Internet. Who Are They?, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Apr. 22, 2019), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/22/some-americans-dont-use-theinternet-who-are-they [https://perma.cc/3B5V-N9MP].
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Octavian Carare et al., The Willingness to Pay for Broadband of Non-Adopters in the U.S.,
30 J. INFO. ECONS. & POL’Y 19 (2015).
196. Id. at 21.
197. Id.
198. See Amol Sharma & Joe Flint, The Great Streaming Battle Is Here. No One Is Safe, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 9, 2019), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-great-streaming-battle-is-here-no-one-is-safe11573272000 [https://perma.cc/5PQJ-7FHU] (“Titans of media and technology are wagering billions
that consumers will pay them a monthly fee to stream TV and movies over the internet . . . . AT&T Inc.
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have switched to paid service, 199 it is very likely that most media companies will
eventually adopt a similar strategy. Unlike the advertising-supported model of
broadcasting that existed for nearly a century, much of the original programming and
news content published online is moving behind paywalls and further limiting access
to a significant population.200 “Thus, those who might benefit the most from good
internet access – and its ability to provide access to jobs, education, and knowledge
– may be the least likely to have it. This ‘digital divide’ is well-documented.”201
Information access is a recognized fundamental right, 202 and that public policy
has transformed the role of the Internet into an essential service. Efforts have been
made by Congress through the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to narrow this
gap.203 Among the goals, all providers of telecommunications services are expected
to “make an equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and
advancement of universal service”204 and provide “specific, predictable and
sufficient Federal and State mechanisms to preserve and advance universal
service.”205 These public policy goals will not be met merely by helping fund the
price of the broadband service, but must also expand to address the cost of the
paywalls for news, entertainment, and cultural services.
As a result of the shift from free, public media to pay-walled online content, the
purpose of the Telecommunication Act’s universal service requirements needs to be
expanded to include a funding strategy to provide the content that makes the Internet
so valuable. “The case for a robust universal service program is even stronger in the
digital age. As more of our daily activities move online, it becomes increasingly
important to make sure that all consumers can continue to participate in society and
benefit from the information revolution.” 206
B. Prohibition of Digital Redlining
Also embedded in the universal service requirements are obligations to provide
and Comcast Corp.’s NBCUniversal next year will mount their own challenges to streaming juggernaut
Netflix Inc.”).
199. See Laura Hazard Owen, Tighten up That Paywall! (And Some Other Lessons from a Study of
500 Newspaper Publishers), NIEMAN LAB (Aug. 13, 2019, 9:00 AM),
http://www.niemanlab.org/2019/08/tighten-up-that-paywall-and-some-other-lessons-from-a-study-of500-newspaper-publishers/ [https://perma.cc/QB7G-93JX] (stating that paywall models have “become
common among newspaper publishers – 76 percent of whom had one in place in 2019”).
200. See Karthik Babu Nattamai Kannan, Essays on the Economics of Internet Enabled Markets:
Last Mile Internet, E–Commerce, and Digital Divide 6 (Aug. 2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgia
Institute of Technology).
201. Id.
202. See World Summit for Social Development, Report of the World Summit for Social
Development, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (Apr. 19, 1995) (“Absolute poverty is a condition
characterized by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe drinking water,
sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It depends not only on income but also
on access to social services.”).
203. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 104(a), 110 Stat. 56, 71 (current
version at 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2018)).
204. § 254(b)(4).
205. Id. § 254(b)(5).
206. Daniel A. Lyons, Narrowing the Digital Divide: A Better Broadband Universal Service
Program, 52 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 803, 809 (2018).
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the telecommunication services in “an equitable and nondiscriminatory” manner. 207
At first blush, the transition of media from broadcast television to the Internet should
reduce rather than increase the risk of discriminatory programming. After all, a UHF
broadcaster serving a small geographic market may select programming based on the
stereotypes associated with that geographic region, excluding minority populations.
In contrast to this hypothetical, the Spanish language broadcaster Univision is the
only broadcast network to show market growth in 2018 because it can leverage its
terrestrial broadcast with streaming and other platforms. 208
Nonetheless, there is a significant risk that the ability to track the individual
consumers on internet-based devices could lead to market segregation based on
discriminatory practices under various state and federal laws. 209 Targeting or
withholding services based on race, color, national origin, sex, religion, familial
status, physical or mental disability, age, sexual orientation, military or veteran’s

207. § 254(b)(3)-(4).
(3) Access in rural and high cost areas
Consumers in all regions of the Nation, including low-income consumers and those in
rural, insular, and high cost areas, should have access to telecommunications and
information services, including interexchange services and advanced
telecommunications and information services, that are reasonably comparable to those
services provided in urban areas and that are available at rates that are reasonably
comparable to rates charged for similar services in urban areas.
(4) Equitable and nondiscriminatory contributions
All providers of telecommunications services should make an equitable and
nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and advancement of universal
service.
Id.
208. See Univision to End 2018 as the Only Broadcast Network with Primetime Audience Growth
During Fourth Quarter, Finishes Year As No. 1 Spanish-Language Network Across Primetime and
Total Day, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 19, 2018),
http://apnews.com/ed2c1ef179fa436b9663df1eba370180 [https://perma.cc/5YXK-K972] (“Univision . .
. is set to end 2018 as the only top–rated broadcast network reporting audience growth in primetime
during fourth quarter.”); see also Natalie Escobar, How Spanish-Language Broadcasters Gave Voice to
America’s Hispanics, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/how-spanish-language-broadcasters-gavevoice-americas-hispanics-180966985/ [https://perma.cc/W66X-F687] (“Ever since Telemundo launched
in Puerto Rico in 1954 and expanded to the U.S . . . . they have spoken directly to a community who
were never properly served by English-only stations. ‘Those people are the people we are privileged to
give a voice.’”).
209. See Angelisa C. Plane et al., Exploring User Perceptions of Discrimination in Online Targeted
Advertising, in 26th USENIX SEC. SYMP. 936 (USENIX Ass’n ed., Aug. 16-18, 2017) (“[O]nline
behavioral advertising . . . has also raised serious concerns including threats to consumer privacy and the
potential for discrimination. [In one example,] Google showed ads promoting certain high-paying jobs
more frequently to men than women.”); JOSEPH TUROW, NICHE ENVY: MARKETING DISCRIMINATION IN
THE DIGITAL AGE 186 (Routledge, 6th ed. 2017) (“For decades, marketing and media firms learned as
much as they could about social groups (women, baby boomers, rich people, African-Americans, and so
on) . . . . The emerging process is almost the opposite: They learn enormous amounts about individuals .
. . then determine whether and how . . . to deal with them.”); Brendesha M. Tynes et al., An
Unwelcomed Digital Visitor in the Classroom: The Longitudinal Impact of Online Racial
Discrimination on Academic Motivation, 44 SCH. PSYCH. REV. 407 (2015) (“Online racial
discrimination experiences often reflect attacks on the humanity and intelligence of members of specific
racial groups (e.g., African Americans and Latinos). Such experiences may have detrimental effects on
academic outcomes over time.”).
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status, genetic information, or use of public subsidies are all identifiers that can be
applied in an illegal and discriminatory fashion.210
There is a long history of using both discriminatory and facially neutral data to
further racial discrimination.211 Known as “redlining,”212 this practice is now illegal,
but it is still not uncommon.213 It originated with the Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation (HOLC), the predecessor of the Fair Housing Administration, 214 which
later became part of U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 215
“HOLC appraisers divided cities into neighborhoods and developed forms which
were distributed to real estate professionals . . . [incorporating] ‘notions of ethnic and
racial worth’ utilized by real estate appraisers.”216 Expanding on the redlining
practices of the HOLC, the Fair Housing Administration used lot size, setbacks,
single-dwelling rules, and professional estimates to set a policy that devalued urban
communities and prized suburban developments in a systematic practice that
strongly disadvantaged African-American home owners.217 “Foremost among the
variables considered by the [Fair Housing Administration] appraisal were the
location of the property and the racial composition of the surrounding
neighborhood.”218
Eventually, of course, Congress passed Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of

210. See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 3604 (2018); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018).
211. See Charles Lewis Nier III, The Shadow of Credit: The Historical Origins of Racial Predatory
Lending and Its Impact upon African American Wealth Accumulation, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE
131, 170 (2008) (“At the beginning of the twentieth century, the majority of African Americans resided
in the South, trapped in a system of debt peonage driven by predatory lending and crop liens that
deprived them of the ability to accumulate assets.”); Margalynne Armstrong, Race and Property Values
in Entrenched Segregation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1051, 1056 (1998).
212. Denver D’Rozario & Jerome D. Williams, Retail Redlining: Definition, Theory, Typology, and
Measurement, 25 J. MACROMARKETING 175, 175 (Dec. 2005).
Redlining is a widely known practice that used to be employed by banks and insurance
companies in the United States in the past. Firms in these industries, when they employed
this practice, would decide that they were not going to serve certain neighborhoods, if they
were composed primarily of ethnic-minority households, regardless of their
creditworthiness or insurability. Consequently, they would, for example, take a map of the
area in question and, using a red pencil, place a red line around the areas they were not
going to serve and use such a marked-up map (often prominently displayed in offices in
firms that employed this practice) as a visual aid to guide their responses to all future
requests for loans and insurance policies from the area in question.
Id.
213. Id. (Redlining was “outlawed by the federal government through the Fair Housing Act of 1968.
Consequently, it is now not as common a practice as it used to be, although it still figures from time to
time in sporadic lawsuits and settlements.”).
214. See Nier, supra note 211, at 175, 179.
215. See The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), HUD, http://www.hud.gov/program_offices
/housing/fhahistory [https://perma.cc/RB25-FPV9] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
216. Nier, supra note 211, at 176-77 (quoting KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 199 (1985)).
217. Id. at 182 (“Indeed, by 1960, nearly three-fourths of the African American population was
concentrated in cities throughout the United States. First, the FHA favored the financing of singlefamily detached homes over multifamily projects by adopting polices which favored open areas outside
the congested center city.”).
218. Id.
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1968, later known as the Fair Housing Act. 219 Enforcing the Fair Housing Act
(FHA), HUD reversed its policy, and eventually it became a champion for fair
housing. Through congressional expansion and court decisions, overt racism has
been reduced.220
In early 2019, HUD sued Facebook for violations of the FHA precisely because
it facilitated ad buyers targeting “audiences that included or excluded certain races,
religions, or genders.”221 Earlier cases of internet-based housing discrimination had
mixed results. In Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., the Seventh Circuit applied Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act to the ads posted by users of the craigslist service.222 Craigslist had no
editorial role and did not write any of the ads itself. The court explained that
“[n]othing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any particular listing
or express a preference for discrimination . . . [and if] craigslist “causes” the
discriminatory notices, then so do phone companies and courier services.”223 In
contrast, Roomates.com was not protected by Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act because it did much more than simply post the advertisements provided
by the public.
In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.com,224 the service required parties seeking roommates to fill out a
questionnaire that enabled site users to discriminate on matters of sex, sexual
orientation, and family status of the roommate. “Roommate’s own acts – posting the
questionnaire and requiring answers to it – are entirely its doing and thus section 230
of the CDA does not apply to them.” 225
Today, digital tracking technology can do far more to find the answers to the
questions asked in the Roomates.com questionnaire. Databases that cross-reference
a person’s online activities, physical movements, purchasing history, and charitable
giving can create profiles that are highly predictive for many of the race, sex,
nationality, sexual preference and other categorizations. And—while most
advertisers are primarily concerned with age, sex, wealth, and geographic
information—the other criteria will enable the advertiser to focus its ads on target
populations and withhold those ads from individuals who do not meet the
advertiser’s target audience. Since it is a violation of the FHA to advertise for a
“whites only” apartment complex,226 it should similarly be a violation for advertisers
219. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 9-284, §§ 801-819, 82 Stat. 73, 81-89 (1968) (current version at
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19, 3631 (2018)). The Fair Housing Act was improved with the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619.
220. McKivitz v. Twp. of Stowe, 769 F. Supp. 2d 803, 815 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (“The FHA must be
broadly construed to effectuate its purpose of providing for ‘fair housing throughout the United States.’”
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3601)). But see Armstrong, supra note 211, at 1052 (“Although Title VIII is
finally providing substantial monetary remedies, the frequency of complaints and awards indicate that
extensive housing discrimination still occurs.”).
221. Adi Robertson, What Happens Next in the Housing Discrimination Case Against Facebook?,
VERGE (Apr. 2, 2019, 1:09 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2019/4/2/18286660/facebook-hud-housingdiscrimination-case-section-230-legal-defense [https://perma.cc/4AWV-5E68].
222. Chi. Laws.’ Comm. for C.R. Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
223. Id. at 671-72.
224. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008).
225. Id. at 1165.
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2018).
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to discriminate by using their a promotional budget to target likely white customers
but not purchasing ads distributed to African American or Hispanic customers. 227
Access to housing is just one example of the potential for digital redlining.
Billions of dollars are spent by pharmaceutical companies on advertising each
year.228 A study from back in 2005, before the explosion in pharmaceutical
television ads, focused on magazine ads.229 The study found that “readers of African
American and Hispanic magazines were exposed to proportionally fewer healthpromoting advertisements and more health-diminishing advertisements.
Photographs of African American role models were more often used to advertise
products with negative health impact than positive health impact, while the reverse
was true of Caucasian role models.”230
As a consequence, the targeting of minorities in advertising likely plays a
contributing factor for poorer health outcomes. 231 “An extensive literature on
television, radio, print, and Internet ads has examined the ways in which the food
industry targets minority audiences.”232 To the extent that outdoor advertising can
be used to target particular populations, the patterns are clear: “communities at
highest risk of obesity, low-income Latinos and African-Americans, had the highest
density of unhealthy food and beverage ads. Disparities were present also in lowincome neighborhoods, regardless of race, and in multiracial neighborhoods,
regardless of income.”233 The only advertising more specifically targeted than
neighborhood outdoor ads are targeted behavioral ads.
For broadcast, the FCC has regulations requiring the disclosure of payments for
advertising, when those ads are not self-evident.234 They are primarily designed to
restrict the practice of payola, or paying programmers to promote certain songs on
radio or particular content on television. 235 These rules, however, do not control the
227. See id. § 3535(d) (2019). See generally, Advertising Guidelines, NAT’L FAIR HOUSING ALL.,
http://nationalfairhousing.org/responsibleadvertising/ [https://perma.cc/BE79-WWWH] (last visited Oct.
30, 2020).
228. Beth Mole, Big Pharma Shells Out $20B Each Year to Schmooze Docs, $6B on Drug Ads, ARS
TECHNICA, at 3 (Jan. 11, 2019, 11:25 AM), http://arstechnica.com/science/2019/01/healthcare-industryspends-30b-on-marketing-most-of-it-goes-to-doctors/ [https://perma.cc/RWA6-LWRT] (“[M]oney spent
on [direct–to–consumer]—mostly TV commercials and glossy magazine ads—went from $2.1 billion in
1997 to $9.6 billion in 2016. And of that $9.6 billion, about $6 billion was for marketing prescription
drugs, the analysis found.”).
229. Susan C. Duerksen et al., Health Disparities and Advertising Content of Women’s Magazines:
A Cross–sectional Study, 5 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1, 2 (Aug. 18, 2005), https://bmcpublichealth
.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1471-2458-5-85 [https://perma.cc/56YE-3HQX].
230. Id. at 1.
231. Diana L. Cassady et al., Disparities in Obesity–Related Outdoor Advertising by Neighborhood
Income and Race, 92 J. URB. HEALTH 835, 835 (2015) (“African-Americans and Latinos are more likely
to be obese and to suffer disproportionately from diabetes, heart disease, and other obesity–related
conditions compared to their white counterparts.”).
232. Id. (“Food marketing is a leading driver of the obesity epidemic where each food advertisement
serves as a prompt for automatic eating.”).
233. Id. at 841.
234. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 507 (2018) (requiring sponsorship disclosure).
235. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212, (2019), (establishing broadcasters’ responsibilities for
sponsorship identification); Payola and Sponsorship Identification – SPONSID, FCC, https://www.
fcc.gov/enforcement/orders/1835 [https://perma.cc/5E3C-KDTM] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (“If record
companies, or their agents, are paying persons other than the broadcast licensee (such as the station’s
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placement of the advertising or create any obligation to provide the same economic
opportunity to acquire goods and services to all consumers equally. The national
nature of most broadcast networks and the lack of sophisticated targeting technology
has meant that the FCC has not addressed redlining in the context of television
broadcasting. The FCC has received a complaint about redlining in the context of
cable service speeds against AT&T, supported by a study provided by the National
Digital Inclusion Alliance, highlighting concerns about disparate treatment in the
delivery of services.236
As noted by the Supreme Court, “[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”237 Once advertising is made
available to the public, the civil rights that protect against discrimination can be
reasonably balanced against what is only an economic burden to include the public
equally rather than to target in a discriminatory fashion. 238
Targeted media and advertising are often supported by complex algorithms. 239
As consumers watch media and interact with commercial products through online
engagement and commercial transactions, the data collected is used to build
individual customer profiles used to select and highlight the next set of promoted
products and services.240 The goal for content providers is to maximize market

Music Director or its on-air personality) to have records aired, and fail to disclose that fact to the
licensee, the person making such payments, and the recipient, are also subject to criminal fine,
imprisonment or both.”).
236. See Formal Complaint at 1-2, Elkins v. AT&T Corp., No. EB-17-002 (filed Sept. 27, 2017),
https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/1092355565047/Final%20Elkins%20Lee%20Lanfair%20vs%20ATT%20Re
dlining%20Cleveland_updated_9.22_v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XTL-ZZ5K]; John Eggerton, Broadband
Redlining Complaint Filed Against AT&T at FCC, BROAD.+CABLE (Aug. 24, 2017),
https://www.nexttv.com/news/broadband-redlining-complaint-filed-against-att-fcc-168100
[https://perma.cc/46BG-4JKV] (“The complainants . . . allege that ‘wealthier and predominantly white
areas have gotten premium upgradable high speed broadband access at bullet speed,’ while the three
complainants ‘receive slow speeds . . . although they pay AT&T for high speed access.’” (quoting
Formal Complaint at 1-2, Elkins v. AT&T Corp.)).
237. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
238. Cost is certainly a reasonable basis for scaling the size of an advertising campaign. The
balancing is only required where the cost is reduced by using race or other discriminatory tests for the
provision of those advertisements. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180,
189 (1997) (allowing some economic burdens provided the regulation “does not burden substantially
more speech than necessary to further the compelling government interests”).
239. See Nicholas Carah, Algorithmic Brands: A Decade of Brand Experiments with Mobile and
Social Media,19 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 384, 385 (2015) (“The emergence of data–driven web–based
media enables brands to customise and personalise content. And, the data consumers generate enable
media organisations to qualify the audience attention they sell in increasingly refined ways.” (internal
citation omitted)); see also, Method & Sys. for Making Targeted Offers, U.S. Patent Appl. Pub. No.
2016/0063547 [0011] (published on Mar. 3, 2016) (In 2016, Mastercard International applied for a
patent to do just this, providing “[a] method for making a targeted offer by an entity to an audience of
potential acceptors using a media streaming service . . . .”).
240. See Carah, supra note 239, at 387-89.
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share,241 and the goal for advertisers is to maximize revenue.242 As algorithms
become faster, the scale grows larger, and the potential for secondary effects of
criteria are left unstudied. These tools can also promote discriminatory practices. 243
A.I.-powered systems have a dark side. Their decisions are only as good as the data
that humans feed them. As their builders are learning, the data used to train deeplearning systems isn’t neutral. It can easily reflect the biases—conscious and
unconscious—of the people who assemble it. And sometimes data can be slanted
by history, encoding trends and patterns that reflect centuries-old discrimination.244

In a recent example, Apple has been accused of gender bias involving its credit
card, issued by Goldman Sachs.245 Goldman Sachs disputes that it collects sex
information or marital status, but acknowledges that it downgrades the significance
of credit cards for applicants who are the secondary holder on the account. 246 This
potentially neutral choice means that the second spouse on a particular credit card—
historically, often the wife—will not be counted as a full credit partner on that card.
The choice regarding the valuation of secondary cards is not inherently
discriminatory, but the impact will be noticeable and significant. It illustrates the
decision making that often occurs and the types of digital redlining that is already
taking place.
As the primary national media producers move into unregulated cyberspace, the
potential for far greater harm only grows. Targeted, discriminatory marketing

241. See Michael Wiggins De Oliveira, Disney vs. Netflix: The Streaming Video Battle Is Officially
On, THE STREET (Apr. 16, 2019, 6:30 AM), http://www.thestreet.com/investing/disney-netflixstreaming-battle-14926392 [https://perma.cc/KF26-Y2PH] (“If Disney delivers a strong platform and
gains significant share, some portion of Netflix’s market cap could be added onto to Disney’s current
market cap.”); Amanda Lotz & Ramon Lobato, Apple, Disney and Netflix’s Streaming Battle Isn’t
Winner–Take–All, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 8, 2019, 7:14 AM), http://theconversation.com/appledisney-and-netflixs-streaming-battle-isnt-winner-take-all-125360 [https://perma.cc/S578-JRPN] (“The
major streaming services – both old and new – all have different catalogs, pricing and strategies. While
all services seek viewers’ time and attention, in other respects they are different beasts.”).
242. See, e.g., Stacy Willis, What is a Revenue Strategy, IMPACT (June 17, 2015),
http://www.impactbnd.com/blog/what-is-a-revenue-strategy [https://perma.cc/ULV9-9XCN] (“Any
successful company would agree that its top priority is to drive revenue through their sales process . . . .
By aligning the content you publish with your target audience’s interests, you naturally attract organic
website traffic that you can then convert, close, and delight. This, in turn, generates more revenue.”).
243. See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016) (describing inherently biased algorithms as
“weapons of math destruction” to catalog the unintended and harmful consequences of indiscriminate
use of data for decision making); Neil Vigdor, Apple Card Faces Investigated After Gender
Discrimination Complaints, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2019, at B4 (“‘Any algorithm that intentionally or not
results in discriminatory treatment of women or any other protected class violates New York law,’ an
agency spokeswoman said in a statement on Saturday night.”).
244. Jonathan Vanian, Unmasking A.I.’s Bias Problem, FORTUNE (June 25, 2018, 6:30 AM),
http://fortune.com/longform/ai-bias-problem/ [https://perma.cc/WC4P-723D].
245. See Jen Wieczner & David Z. Morris, The Apple Card’s Algorithm Goes Both Ways on
Women’s Credit Limits, FORTUNE (Nov. 13, 2019, 11:49 AM), http://fortune.com/2019/11/13/applecard-bias-women-goldman-sachs/ [https://perma.cc/4HQS-QEZ2] (“David Heinemeier Hansson . . .
began tweeting last week that the Apple Card . . . was a ‘sexist program.’ He had received a credit limit
20 times higher than the measly $57.24 limit his wife received . . . despite the fact that they have shared
assets and her credit score is higher . . . .”).
246. See id.
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already exists. In the future, integrating customer tracking with these discriminatory
practices could yield a much costlier, and potentially deadlier outcome.
Recently, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) highlighted the ongoing
practices of consumer tracking.247 As part of the 2019 Black Friday shopping season,
the FBI issued a warning stating “[b]eyond the risk that your TV manufacturer and
app developers may be listening and watching you, that television can also be a
gateway for hackers to come into your home.”248 The FBI highlighted that many
new smart TVs include microphones and built-in cameras.249
“In some cases,” the warning explained, “the cameras are used for facial
recognition so the TV knows who is watching and can suggest programming
appropriately.”250 The use of these devices is premised on the exploitation of the
audience member’s behavior and viewing information. Mobile devices also have
cameras, microphones, and similar capabilities to add surveillance to the consumer
profile.
Advertising targeted at taking advantage of a particular audience, such as
minors, has been regulated by the FCC and may constitute a deceptive or unfair
practice under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act). 251 The
advertisers might also run afoul of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule.252
The FTC has also taken action in the past to stop deceptive advertisements targeted
at children, including the ballerina doll who could not dance on her own, 253 the toy
helicopter that did not actually fly, 254 or the horse that could not stand up.255 But
247. Jason Aten, If You Bought a Smart TV on Black Friday, the FBI Has a Warning for You: Your
Brand–New Smart TV Might Have All the Latest Technology, but It’s Still Vulnerable to Hackers, INC.
(Sept. 25, 2020, 8:56 AM), http://www.inc.com/jason-aten/if-you-bought-a-smart-tv-on-black-fridayfbi-has-a-warning-for-you.html [https://perma.cc/9Z65-LQ86].
248. Id. (The warning continued, stating that a “bad cyber actor may not be able to access your
locked-down computer directly, but it is possible that your unsecured TV can give him or her an easy
way in the backdoor through your router.”).
249. Beth Anne Steele, Oregon FBI Tech Tuesday: Securing Smart TVs, FBI PORTLAND (Nov. 26,
2019), http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/portland/news/press-releases/tech-tuesdaysmarttvs/?=portland-field-office [https://perma.cc/GF4V-T7NQ].
250. Id.
251. See Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”)).
252. See Kristin Cohen, YouTube Channel Owners: Is Your Content Directed to Children?, FTC
BUS. BLOG (Nov. 22, 2019, 12:56 PM), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/businessblog/2019/11/youtube-channel-owners-your-content-directed-children [https://perma.cc/E2HV-DXBZ]
(“COPPA applies in the same way it would if the channel owner had its own website or app. If a
channel owner uploads content to a platform like YouTube, the channel might meet the definition of a
‘website or online service’ covered by COPPA, depending on the nature of the content and the
information collected.”); Press Release, FTC, Google and YouTube Will Pay Record $170 Million for
Alleged Violations of Children’s Privacy Law, (Sept. 4, 2019), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2019/09/google-youtube-will-pay-record-170-million-alleged-violations
[https://perma.cc/55EU-ABKX] (Google and its subsidiary, YouTube required to pay a record $170
million “for allegedly violating the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) Rule.”).
253. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 187, 188 (1991) (consent order).
254. Hasbro, Inc., 116 F.T.C. 657 (1993) (consent order).
255. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 93 F.T.C. 749 (1979) (consent order); see J. Howard Beales, III,
Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A Regulatory Retrospective That Advises the Present, 12 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 873, 875 (2004).
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these cases are relatively rare and do not necessarily relate well to the unregulated
broadcast of entertainment content that play as little more than program-length
commercials which fall under the jurisdiction by the FCC for broadcast television.256
There are no similar rules for online platforms, so Amazon Prime can run hours of
children’s programming featuring program-length commercials with embedded “buy
now” buttons driving purchasing behavior on the Amazon Toy Store component of
the marketplace.
In the context of digital redlining, the FTC needs to do much more. At a
presentation before the American Bar Association, FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra
noted the problem. “Outsized power in the tech market has invited scrutiny about a
panoply of problems, from mass surveillance to digital redlining to the decline of
journalism.”257 The FTC must take actions that recognize the use of algorithms that
discriminate, product placements that are selected on the basis of race and other
inappropriate qualifiers, and behavioral advertising that is designed to provide
separate and inequal treatment; all of which constitute unfair and deceptive trade
practices that violate the FTC Act. 258 This leadership will also help empower the
states to treat these trade practices as illegal under the state versions of the unfair and
deceptive trade laws.259
Whether the practice is focused on children, minorities, or other groups, the
examples of advertiser misconduct are sufficiently robust to make this an ongoing
concern. Additional risks also exist, such as the media companies selling the
behavior information to insurance companies and employers to be used to make
underwriting decisions or hiring decisions. While most content regulation may be
overreaching, the basic antidiscrimination policies that already exist in state and
federal law need to be explicitly incorporated into regulations governing the practices
for online media. For most of the harmful behavior, this can be done through
additional FTC guidance on its existing advertising policies. For certain other areas,
however, such as the facilitation of housing discrimination and other forms of
discrimination of public accommodations, Congress will need to revise the section
230 of the CDA to reflect the modern nature of the Internet.
C. Regulating Intrusions into Privacy
As noted in the previous section, many of the concerns about digital redlining
often start with the exploitation of personal data, highlighting the concerns about the

256. See Pol’ys & Rules Concerning Child.’s Television Programming, Report and Order, 6 FCC
Rcd. 2111, 2118 para. 44 (Apr. 9, 1991); Pol’ys & Rules Concerning Child.’s Television Programming,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 5093, 5099 para. 31 (Aug. 1, 1991).
257. Comm’r Rohit Chopra, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Remarks at the Am. Bar Ass’n
Section of Antitrust L. Ann. Spring Meeting: Tech Platforms, Content Creators, and Immunity (Mar. 28,
2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1510713/chopra_-_aba_spring
_meeting_3-28-19_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/DWF2-EUMW].
258. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018).
259. Jonathan Lazar, The Potential Role of Us Consumer Protection Laws in Improving Digital
Accessibility for People with Disabilities, 22 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 185, 198-99 (2019) (“By the
1980s, every state had some form of Consumer Protection Act (CPA), which vary greatly but generally
offer a private right of action.”); see Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer
Protection Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 169, 173 (2011).
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unregulated use of consumer information. But the concerns about intrusion into
privacy extend to all consumers, not just those who may fall within protected
classifications under state or federal law.
Both advertisers and content creators desire to know as much about their
audiences as possible.260 Integrating microphones, cameras, GPS, biometrics, IoT
enabled products, and facial recognition into the devices used to consume content
has the potential to strip away almost all notions of privacy. It is not too fanciful to
imagine that heart rate monitoring technology integrated into wearable devices
(including smartwatches, headphones, or other wearables) can be tied to the
consumption of adult content to inform producers which passages have the most
immediate salacious impact, as well as to report on the extent to which the consumer
fast forwards videos and flips past the pages of the content that furthers the plot in
search of the next moment of titillation.261 The days of finding the dirty passages in
Lady Chatterley’s Lover by checking for dog-eared pages are long gone. 262 Sellers
of fast food, alcohol, cigarettes, lottery tickets, and casino visits could carefully
260. See, e.g., Martin Jones, Knowing Your Audience is Key to Content Marketing Success, SOC.
MEDIA TODAY (June 9, 2016), http://www.socialmediatoday.com/marketing/knowing-your-audiencekey-content-marketing-success [https://perma.cc/UGQ4-H6UW] (“This is a fundamental part of
marketing your business – before you can deliver a marketing message effectively, you need to know
who you’re delivering it to and why.”); Spider Graham, 5 Steps You Must Take to Reach Your Target
Customer, BUS. JS. (Nov. 19, 2013, 10:26 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/howto/marketing/2013/11/5-steps-all-marketers-should-use-to.html [https://perma.cc/9QHL-KXUA] (“One
of the biggest challenges marketers face is getting word out to the people who are most likely to become
our customers. In fact, the whole goal of all marketing is to ‘get the right message to the right person at
the right time.’”); Philippe Ross, Were Producers and Audiences Ever Separate? Conceptualizing
Media Production as Social Situation, 15 TELEVISION & NEW MEDIA 157, 158 (2014) (“[T]he need for
producers to speak and act on behalf of the intended audience is an important feature of media . . . .
[T]he leap of faith required of producers as they engage, and respond to, groups that they cannot observe
directly or fully know is a feature of mass communication . . . .”).
261. See, e.g., Charlie Warzel, Facebook and Google Trackers Are Showing Up on Porn Sites, N.Y.
TIMES (July 17, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/opinion/google-facebook-sexwebsites.html [https://perma.cc/B8JW-2UWZ] (“A new study scanned 22,484 pornography sites and
found them riddled with trackers from major technology companies.”); Lizzie Dearden, Woman Has Sex
Wearing Fitbit - Here Is What Happened, INDEP. (Aug. 13, 2015, 1:02 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/woman-has-sex-wearing-fitbit-here-what-happened10451295.html [https://perma.cc/P2S2-3DFW] (“Writing on Reddit under the name noveltysin, she said
the wrist-worn gadget started tracking her heart rate after 20 minutes of foreplay. . . . The graph has so
far been viewed more than 1.7 million times on Imgur. . . .”); Jeff John Roberts, Sex Toy Maker Pays
$3.75 Million to Settle ‘Smart’ Vibrator Lawsuit, FORTUNE (Mar. 10, 2017, 6:02 PM),
http://fortune.com/2017/03/10/sex-toy-maker-settlement-smart-vibrator-lawsuit/
[https://perma.cc/6B6K-VQJT] (“[T]he company was [] using the smart phone app to harvest data about
how customers used the vibrators. The apps collected information such as what temperature and
intensity settings the owners used, as well as how often they used the toys.”).
262. See, e.g., Kelly Faircloth, Now You Can Own a Dog-Eared Piece of Obscenity History: This
Copy of Lady Chatterley’s Lover, JEZEBEL (Sept. 26, 2018, 1:43 PM), http://pictorial.jezebel.com/nowyou-can-own-a-dog-eared-piece-of-obscenity-history-1829334478 [https://perma.cc/XF8S-4YQH];
darkorpheus, Comment to Eloise’s Reading List, OUTMODED AUTHORS, (Aug. 19, 2007, 6:41 AM),
http://outmodedauthors.blogspot.com/2007/08/eloises-reading-list.html [https://perma.cc/RKH3-RY2C]
(commenting “[a] friend of mine once passed her copy of Lady Chat to me with the dirty pages dogeared (we were that young once, reading Lawrence and Anne Rice for the SEX!) I forever associate
Lady Chat with mental images of flowers BURSTING into bloom, and vigorous pounding of mortar and
pestle.”).
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monitor their targets to assure that the optimal mix of direct advertising, product
placement, and social media promotions enable the advertisers to know precisely
how best to reshape public behavior. At a minimum, updated regulations should
make such tracking subject to opt-in consent requirements and public disclosures.
The expansion of media consumption on tracking devices should trigger an
understanding that the historical model of sectoral data privacy policy is inadequate
to address the systemic issue involved in tracking a global population. 263 Instead, as
has been highlighted elsewhere, the value of privacy should be characterized as a
public good.264 While each of these products and services are legal to sell to adults,
the public bad caused by optimizing public policy to thwart regulation will lead to
poor health outcomes and other social costs that will be shouldered by all of society,
not just the individual consumer.
The laissez-faire alternative would allow the marketing firms an unregulated
hand to track, target, and incentivize its customers to abuse alcohol and smoke their
lungs out. The employers, insurance companies, and municipalities who shoulder
the costs for these destructive behaviors, would be equally free to apply the same
technologies and tactics to exclude these people from the workforce and the
employment pool. Government could deny public benefits based on the same
tracking. To finish the laissez-faire model, zip-code and other demographic tools
would be added to the hiring and coverage models to squeeze out those individuals
who are associated as likely candidates for unhealthy behavior, which would
generally result in another form of digital redlining. Neither of these outcomes is
socially desirable.
While this example may seem farfetched, it has been well-documented that a
variety of technologies are being used by U.S. and foreign governments to increase
surveillance.265 It is naïve to believe that these agencies would not use the content
263. See Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 IND. L.J. 653, 657 (2019) (“Privacy advocates
cannot assume that merely conceptualizing a right to privacy can protect privacy interests, even if that
right is enshrined in statutory law.”); Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies:
Mismatches Between Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 41-42 (2015);
Kathryn McMahon, Tell the Smart House to Mind Its Own Business!: Maintaining Privacy and Security
in the Era of Smart Devices, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2511 (2018).
264. Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy As a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385, 425
(2015) (“Treating privacy as a public good thus goes a long way toward explaining the central
conundrum of commercial privacy—why it is that consumers claim to want privacy, but do not refuse
valuable goods and services that come at a significant privacy cost to both themselves and others.”);
Priscilla M. Regan, Response to Privacy As a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 51, 64 (2016) (“If
privacy is viewed not as a private good but as a public good, then the policy question becomes how to
encourage individuals as members of groups and organizational platforms on which these groups
operate to take into account social benefits and social costs.”).
265. See, e.g., Chris Buckley & Paul Mozur, How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance to Subdue
Minorities, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/world/asia/chinasurveillance-xinjiang.html [https://perma.cc/A3PV-P7H4] (“[T]he system in Kashgar is on the cutting
edge of what has become a flourishing new market for technology that the government can use to
monitor and subdue millions of Uighurs and members of other Muslim ethnic groups in Xinjiang.”);
Jack Brook, Miami Police to Buy Spy Gear to Track Phones, Social Media, GOVERNING (Oct. 12,
2019), http://www.governing.com/news/headlines/Miami-Police-to-Buy-Spy-Gear-to-Track-PhonesSocial-Media.html [https://perma.cc/4X49-7CK8]; David Gilbert, About 3 Billion Social Media Users
Are Being Spied On by Their Governments, VICE (Nov. 5, 2019, 7:07 AM), http://www.vice.com/en_us
/article/zmj74a/about-three-billion-social-media-users-are-being-watched-by-their-governments
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of media as an additional criteria in their surveillance or that the private sector will
refrain from making the same efforts. Governments, private contractors, and
commercial vendors could all have reasons to track the public based on personal
viewing content in particular languages and dialects; a person downloading or
streaming documentaries promoting specific ideological perspectives; or a person
making positive comments on social media tied to broadcast content. In the absence
of a legitimately issued warrant, such intrusions should not be sanctioned.
The broader issues of privacy in the United States are beyond the scope of this
article. There are unique aspects of traditional media distribution, however, that
reflect a subset of privacy practices. For example, Congress passed the Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988266 to prohibit the sharing of “prerecorded video
cassette tapes or similar audio visual material.”267 The law was extended to some
online streaming services.268 In actions against Cartoon Network and CNN, courts
have distinguished between a subscriber or renter of a streamed video with those who
watch content without first subscribing.269 In denying standing, the court found that
allegations of watching video clips online were insufficient to receive protection
under the statute.270
The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 was further weakened by a 2013
amendment that added a consent provision, enabling rental and streaming companies
to obtain written consent to collect and share the record history and viewership
information.271 The change had been requested by Netflix, which wanted to create
an ability to promote social exchanges around shared viewing habits. 272
Although there are no similar federal laws for public libraries, the majority of
states provide statutory protection from the disclosure of reading histories. 273 Media
content consumption reflects the raw material from which the development of
[https://perma.cc/VV7H-EQ6R] (“‘Governments and populist movements are using social media to
manipulate elections on a grand scale, and governments are using technology to monitor their own
citizens on an unprecedented scale,’ Mike Abramowitz, president of Freedom House, told reporters
Monday.”).
266. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 2710).
267. Id. § 2.
268. See, e.g., Locklear v. Dow Jones & Co., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1312 (N.D. Ga. 2015); In re Hulu
Priv. Litig., No. C 11-03764 LB, 2012 WL 3282960 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2012).
269. Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-02926-ELR, 2016 WL 4373708, at *3 (N.D.
Ga. Apr. 20, 2016), aff’d, 854 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2017).
270. Id.; see also Ellis v. Cartoon Network, Inc., 803 F.3d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2015).
271. Video Privacy Protection Act Amendments of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-258, 126 Stat. 2414
(2013) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B)).
272. See Steven Musil, Obama Signs Netflix–Backed Amendment to Video Privacy Law, C|NET (Jan.
10, 2013, 4:42 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/obama-signs-netflix-backed-amendment-to-videoprivacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/E3VJ-5VTY] (“Netflix, which had argued that the 25-year-old law was
outdated and due for an overhaul, has said it plans to introduce social features for subscribers this year, .
. . Netflix users outside the United States already have the option to link their accounts with
Facebook.”).
273. See Bryan M. Carson, Surveying Privacy: Library Privacy Laws in the Southeastern United
States, 49 SE. LIBRARIAN 19, 19 (2001) (“According to the American Library Association, library
records should be kept private and confidential. Most states also have laws that protect the
confidentiality of library records.”); Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First
Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465 (2015).
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political ideas and free speech are formed. To track a person’s reading or viewing
history has a significant potential to chill speech.274 It has been true in print and in
the video store. It is just as true for the online content consumer. This theoretical
concern is backed by empirical data that “supports the protection of reader and
viewer privacy under many of the theories used to justify First Amendment
protection.”275 It has also been understood by the Supreme Court.
[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract
the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press
includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to
receive, the right to read, and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom
to teach—indeed the freedom of the entire university community. 276

The right to free speech necessarily includes the right to create content and the
right to consume content.277 If the right to receive information has meaning, it should
not be subject to warrantless searches by the government nor commercial
exploitation without consent provided in a meaningful manner that cannot be easily
thwarted through click-wrap agreements, changed unilaterally by ISPs, or made the
condition of access to content.278
The right to review, listen, and view content is a fundamental right. It must be
treated as such and provided federal protection that expands on the original
protections in the Video Privacy Protection Act to include all content consumers
(rather than merely subscribers and renters), to use a broad definition of personal
information, and to make the opt-in consent meaningful, non-conditional, and fully
revocable.
D. Promoting Diversity of Viewpoint and Content in the Public Interest Through
Expanded Antitrust Enforcement and Increased Public Support for News,
Educational, and Cultural Content
The proliferation of online content suggests that concerns over diversity of
viewpoint have disappeared, but this may not be the case. Congress has remained
committed to diversity and public interest.279 Because of social media and the
increased ease to produce podcasts and videos, the production of content has
274. Kaminski & Witnov, supra note 273, at 467.
275. Id.
276. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 143 (1943)); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952).
277. See generally People v. Freeman, 46 Cal. 3d 419 (1988) (upholding the right to make nonobscene, pornographic films as protected by the First Amendment notwithstanding pandering statutes);
Jon Garon, Star Wars: Film Permitting, Prior Restraint & Government’s Role in the Entertainment
Industry, 7 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 47 (1996) (discussing same).
278. See Kaminski & Witnov, supra note 273, at 477; BJ Ard, Confidentiality and the Problem of
Third Parties: Protecting Reader Privacy in the Age of Intermediaries, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 3
(2013); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 387-93 (2008); Marc Jonathan
Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries, the Right to Read, and a
First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799,
799-809 (2006); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 981-83 (1996).
279. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 303 (2018); Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 736 F.3d 1192
(9th Cir. 2013).
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exploded.280 Further, the stark demarcations among content producers, advertisers,
and audiences have been eroded through the development of transmedia and social
media platforms.281
Nonetheless, while the bottleneck for the production of media has diminished,
the competition for audience scale has only increased. Actual media concentration
has increased considerably, especially with the introduction of Netflix, Amazon
Prime, Apple and Google serving both to create original content and to distribute the
content of others.282 Ownership concentration and advertising chokepoints raise
concerns about the nature of the content available to the public. 283 The cost of
promoting a studio-produced movie provides an excellent example:
Hollywood continues to wrestle with rising marketing costs, particularly
overseas, which can make up 70 percent of a film’s gross thanks to booming markets
in Russia, Latin America and Asia. Two years ago, the cost had crept up to $175
million globally. Now, studios say it has hit the $200 million mark per picture . . . .
In 1980, the average cost of marketing a studio movie in the U.S. was $4.3 million
($12.4 million in today’s dollars). By 2007, it had shot up to nearly $36 million. If
the MPAA still tracked spending on P&A, that number would be north of $40 million
today for medium-size films like The Fault in Our Stars or Tammy.284Unlike the
early days of radio, the digital marketplace does not suffer from static and
interference. But the competition for the attention of the audience creates a different
kind of interference that can be solved only through massive advertising investments
or the power of media influencers.285 Both these approaches are focused on selling
280. See NYC MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT, NEW YORK CITY, THE PODCASTING CAPITAL,
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/mome/pdf/MOME_PODCAST_REPORT_Web_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22AY-HSCG] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (As of 2016, “Apple, the platform through
which the majority of podcasts are downloaded, has over 350,000 active podcasts, with 13 million
episodes of audio and video content.”); Bob Woods, The Podcasting Revenue Boom Has Started,
STRATEGY+BUS.: TECH & INNOVATION (Oct. 18, 2018), http://www.strategy-business.com/article/ThePodcasting-Revenue-Boom-Has-Started?gko=d3034 [https://perma.cc/A33Y-F479] (“[T]he audience
has attained critical mass. . . . Simultaneously, the podcast universe has exploded to more than 500,000
shows, and the quality of the content and production values have gone up, as well.”).
281. See Ross, supra note 260, at 158 (“For media and communication theory, then, the opportunity
for audiences to act as mass communicators represents a blurring of production and reception, social
settings typically conceived as interdependent but separate.”).
282. See Ashley Lutz, These 6 Corporations Control 90% of the Media in America, BUS. INSIDER
(June 14, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/these-6-corporations-control-90-of-the-media-inamerica-2012-6?IR=T [https://perma.cc/X89Q-RMJZ] (“In 1983, 90% of US media was controlled by
50 companies; as of 2011, 90% was controlled by just 6 companies . . . . In 2017, the number was also
6.”).
283. Google is particularly of concern in this regard, since it remains primarily an advertising
company that hosts content to drive ad sales. See J. Clement, Advertising Revenue of Google from 2001
to 2019, STATISTA, (Feb. 5, 2020), http://www.statista.com/statistics/266249/advertising-revenue-ofgoogle/ [https://perma.cc/Q7FT-SFAZ] (“In 2019, advertising accounted for the majority of Google’s
total revenue, which amounted to a total of 160.74 billion U.S. dollars. In the most recent fiscal period,
advertising revenue through Google Sites made up 70.9 percent of the company’s revenues.”).
284. Pamela McClintock, $200 Million and Rising: Hollywood Struggles with Soaring Marketing
Costs, HOLLYWOOD REP. MAG. (July 31, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news
/200-million-rising-hollywood-struggles-721818 [https://perma.cc/7YMH-3QNL].
285. See Vivian Wagner, The Power of Influencer Marketing, E–COMMERCE TIMES (Apr 5, 2019,
5:00 AM), https://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/85939.html [https://perma.cc/YSD4-S75A]
(“‘Influencer marketing is one of the fastest-growing marketing channels today,’ said digital strategist
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audiences to the highest bidder.
For the same reasons, the market power of the media conglomerates does raise
some concerns. For example, when Jeff Bezos, founder of Amazon, purchased the
Washington Post, there were concerns about the exploitation of the newspaper to
further a tech-industry agenda.286 Bezos has been circumspect about his role in the
paper, but the economic control remains troubling. 287
There are two discrete governmental approaches to these concerns—expanding
FTC enforcement of antitrust principles and increasing support for publicly funded
education, news, and cultural programming.
The first is to expand antitrust enforcement, with the FTC paying particular
attention to the potential of a future merger or consolidation which tends to lessen
competition among those enterprises that produce the top seventy to eighty percent
of consumed content.288
The market segmentation rules of the Communications Act and
Telecommunications Act have become increasingly weak barriers to media
concentration.289 As recently summarized by the Third Circuit, “[b]y preventing any
one entity from owning more than a certain amount of broadcast media, these rules
limit consolidation and promote a number of interests, commonly stated as

Shane Barker. ‘It involves leveraging social media influencers or key leaders to get more people to trust
your brand,’ he told the E-Commerce Times.”); Rory Cellan-Jones, Tech Tent: The Power of
Influencers, BBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-47001461
[https://perma.cc/98Y4-Z3BT] (Werner Geyser, founder of the Influencer Marketing Hub, asserted “that
there was an average earned media value of $5.20 per dollar spent.” “That earned media value turns out
to include something as nebulous as ‘increasing brand awareness,’ but Mr Geyser insists companies do
see real returns in the form of extra sales.”).
286. See Jack Shafer, What Does Jeff Bezos Want?, POLITICO (Apr. 18, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/04/18/jeff-bezos-amazon-washington-post-217994
[https://perma.cc/3WBL-3UCW] (“By retaining both the editor and the editorial page editor he
inherited, Bezos has maintained the basic course plotted by the Post’s previous owners, the Graham
family. He’s also kept his nose out of news coverage, which has delighted journalists . . . .”).
287. See id.; Alex Shephard, The Other Side of Jeff Bezos’s Washington Post, THE NEW REPUBLIC
(June 27, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/149404/side-jeff-bezoss-washington-post
[https://perma.cc/LAL5-6BF5] (“Since Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos purchased The Washington Post in
2013, the newspaper has been one of the great—and few—success stories in media, legacy or
otherwise.”).
288. See Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law As Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger Standards
Protect the Public Interest, 94 CAL. L. REV. 371, 374 (2006) (“[P]olicy makers concerned with
preserving competition and diversity in media markets should supplement their attention to deregulating
media ownership with attention to improving the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement in deregulated
media markets.”).
289. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111-12
(reducing cross-ownership regulations and directing the FCC to review media ownership rules to
determine whether they are “necessary in the public interest as a result of competition,” and to “repeal or
modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest”); see also 47 CFR § 73.3555
(2020) (regulations on cross-ownership and multiple ownership). See generally 2014 Quadrennial Reg.
Rev.—Rev. of the Comm’n’s Broad Ownership Rules & Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202
of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Second Report and Order, 31 FCC Rcd. 9864 (2016), vacated and
remanded, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 939 F.3d 567 (3rd Cir. 2019); Fox TV Stations, Inc. v.
FCC, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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‘competition, diversity, and localism.” 290 Nonetheless, even before the FCC faces
loss of control over media distributors, it has abandoned this approach for most
purposes.291 Since this Article has stressed that the FCC will lose its jurisdictional
ability to impose these regulations on companies not involved in over-the-air
broadcasting, the loss of anti-competition rules has only a short-term public harm. If
anything, the continued enforcement of these rules might have motivated companies
to abandon their over-the-air broadcasting earlier, such that their repeal may have
some limited benefit.
It remains, however, that the FCC action has placed most antitrust and anticompetition issues in the hands of the FTC. Fortunately, the FTC does not base its
jurisdiction on the scarcity doctrine or the public interest of the airwaves. Instead,
the FTC bases its regulation on the Sherman Act,292 FTC Act,293 and the Clayton
Act.294 There is ample space within the traditional jurisdiction of the FTC to address
the accumulation of market power achieved as a result of media industry
consolidation and its negative impact on the ability for new entrants to purchase
sufficient advertising and influence to gain market share. There is also an
opportunity for the FTC to look more carefully at the negative impacts of tying
arrangements,295 which had once been unlawful per se296, but now require that the
seller have appreciable market power.297 The market power of the media companies
and the companies operating the two largest app stores have significant power to
290. Prometheus Radio Project, 939 F.3d at 573 (reviewing the FCC’s diversity initiatives and
broadcast media ownership rules).
291. Order on Reconsideration, supra note 141, at 9802 para. 2. The action ended a century of
cross–ownership policies designed to promote diversity of viewpoint:
Specifically, we (1) eliminate the Newspaper/Broadcast Cross-Ownership Rule; (2)
eliminate the Radio/Television Cross-Ownership Rule; (3) revise the Local Television
Ownership Rule to eliminate the Eight-Voices Test and to modify the Top-Four Prohibition
to better reflect the competitive conditions in local markets; (4) decline to modify the
market definitions relied on in the Local Radio Ownership Rule, but provide a presumption
for certain embedded market transactions; (5) eliminate the attribution rule for television
joint sales agreements (JSAs); and (6) retain the disclosure requirement for shared service
agreements (SSAs) involving commercial television stations.
Id.
292. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-2) (Section 1, prohibiting unreasonable restraints of trade; and Section 2, prohibiting the
monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to monopolize).
293. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 45) (prohibiting unfair and deceptive trade practices).
294. Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, §3, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 14)
(prohibiting anticompetitive sales conditions and practices).
295. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 462 (1992) (explaining that a
“tying arrangement is ‘an agreement by a party to sell one product on the condition that the buyer also
purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any
other supplier’”).
296. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (“It is far too late in the history
of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying arrangements pose an
unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable ‘per se.’”), abrogated by Ill.
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (eliminating presumption of monopoly power
for patented product).
297. PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 815 n.2 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Ill.
Tool Works, Inc., 547 U.S. at 38-40.
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promote a particular media product or to bury it beyond the reach of the ordinary
consumer. If a media host features an app, game, or movie, it jumps to the top of the
public’s attention.298 If it does not show up early in the search results, most
consumers will go elsewhere.299 The advice given to developers to be featured on
the app stores is to incorporate the tools of the platform’s developer and to be
interactive with all versions of the platform developer’s products. 300 If it is a
requirement to be featured on the Apple App store that the proposed app must work
on iPhones, iPads, and Apple Watches, then perhaps the market share and tying
requirements are met.
As media content moves to app marketplaces on Roku, Amazon Fire, and similar
devices, the potential to throttle or prioritize content for noncompetitive purposes
becomes increasingly likely. When these issues arose in broadcast and cable,
Congress adopted must-carry rules to protect the public from similar anticompetitive behavior and to promote content diversity and localism. 301 The FTC
must be prepared to take similar steps using the regulations under its jurisdiction. If
the FTC determines that these competitive games are not barred by existing
regulations, then Congress should act to protect the public from uncompetitive
behavior among the media conglomerates to continue to promote content diversity.
The second strategy to promote viewpoint and content diversity is for federal
and state agencies to fund free educational and cultural content, and to support the
nonprofit sector in these efforts. As empirical research demonstrates:
[B]roadcasting subsidies create better informed . . . [and] more equally informed
citizens. . . . [Public broadcasters] focus on goals other than attracting the largest
audience and provide more political coverage. This in turn creates higher levels of
political knowledge among viewers of public broadcasting and works to blunt
knowledge variations created by differences in class . . . and political interest.302

298. See Top 10 Ways to Get Your App Featured in the App Store, CLEARBRIDGE MOBILE,
https://clearbridgemobile.com/top-10-ways-to-get-your-app-featured-in-the-app-store/
[https://perma.cc/7TDZ-3FFT] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (“Everybody wants to be featured in the App
Store. A spot on Apple’s feature page is a powerful way to boost traffic, increase visibility and drive
downloads. With over 2 million apps available in the App Store today, the competition for getting
noticed by editors is aggressive.”).
299. See id.
300. See Deepak Abbot, How to Get Featured on the App Store Today, GROWTH BUG (Sept. 1,
2018), https://growthbug.com/how-to-get-featured-on-the-app-store-today-tab-19ed37cf5afc
[https://perma.cc/2S2S-2H6V] (“Apple doesn’t pick up apps randomly. . . . [P]aid apps, or apps with inapp purchases, are more likely to be featured, especially if those apps have high ratings and are available
for other Apple products, such as the iPad or the Apple Watch.”); App Hacks: How to Get Your Android
App Featured on the Google Play Store, INSTABUG BLOG, https://instabug.com/blog/android-appfeatured-google-play/ [https://perma.cc/EUK4-WA2A] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (“Google releases
tons of products each year at Google I/O, such as Firebase and Google Maps SDKs, for developers to
make use of them. . . . Google tends to feature strong apps using these new technologies as a way of
validating their own innovations.”).
301. See 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1)(B) (2018); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 630
(1994).
302. Patrick O’Mahen, A Big Bird Effect? The Interaction Among Public Broadcasting, Public
Subsidies, and Political Knowledge, 8 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 311, 312 (2016) (“[P]ublic broadcasters that
rely on government subsidies can break out of the shareholder-profit model embraced by commercial
broadcasters. This consistent revenue stream allows them to focus on goals other than attracting the
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Through additional empirical research, it has been demonstrated that high
quality public media broadcasts both increased the public’s general interest in
becoming better informed and increased the willingness to watch media representing
a more diverse set of political viewpoints.303 High quality educational programming
and programming addressing cultural interests not captured by the commercial
market promote diversity of viewpoint and an informed citizenry. These results
reinforce the congressional findings that serve as the basis for the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting:
(1) it is in the public interest to encourage the growth and development of public
radio and television broadcasting, including the use of such media for instructional,
educational, and cultural purposes;
(2) it is in the public interest to encourage the growth and development of
nonbroadcast telecommunications technologies for the delivery of public
telecommunications services;
(3) expansion and development of public telecommunications and of diversity of
its programming depend on freedom, imagination, and initiative on both local and
national levels;
(4) the encouragement and support of public telecommunications, while matters of
importance for private and local development, are also of appropriate and important
concern to the Federal Government;
...
(9) it is in the public interest for the Federal Government to ensure that all citizens
of the United States have access to public telecommunications services through all
appropriate available telecommunications distribution technologies; and
(10) a private corporation should be created to facilitate the development of public
telecommunications and to afford maximum protection from extraneous
interference and control.304

The nature of content produced for public radio and public television are often
quite different than the commercial content produced by the media conglomerates.
The nonprofit content producers have the ability to emphasize children’s
programming and programming designed to address traditionally underserved
communities. While some of the content is similar to commercial productions
(particularly during pledge drives), these broadcasters have the ability and the
mandate to address the public interest without the commercial pressures that exist
largest audience and provide more political coverage.”); see also Karen Donders, Public Service Media
Beyond the Digital Hype: Distribution Strategies in a Platform Era, 41 MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 1011
(2019); Laia Castro-Herrero et al., Bridging Gaps in Cross-Cutting Media Exposure: The Role of Public
Service Broadcasting, 35 POL. COMMC’N. 542 (2018).
303. Castro-Herrero et al., supra note 302, at 553.
[M]edia systems with strong PSB facilitate access to politically balanced news information,
and spread standards of political diversity across media outlets. This increases the
opportunities for less motivated individuals to encounter cross-cutting information without
actively searching for it and have an equalizing effect on the level crosscutting exposure
between more and less politically interested individuals. . . . Our findings thus complement
cross-national studies showing that lower news media fragmentation and greater news
reach provide citizens with abilities and motivations conducive to all forms of news media
exposure.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
304. § 396(a)(1)-(4), (9), (10).
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among the commercial ventures.
These efforts do nothing to discourage the commercial marketplace and they fall
well within the promotional powers of Congress and the states. 305 The government
has a long history of providing financing to support arts, education, and culture
without running afoul of any First Amendment limitations. 306 The Supreme Court
has made clear that “government has broad discretion to make content-based
judgments in deciding what private speech to make available to the public.” 307
As the government reduces its involvement in the regulation of broadcast
content and monetizes the frequencies dropped from broadcast, 308 Congress should
move to set aside these funds as a trust for funding noncommercial content rather
than merely providing yet another subsidy to the media conglomerates that have
benefitted from the public interest revenue for so many generations. 309
An additional benefit of an endowed trust is that it enables federal and state
funding while separating the decisions about spending the funds from the vagaries
of congressional politicking.310 It creates a long-term, sustainable model for
nonprofit and public-sector arts, news, and media organizations to help foster the
diversity of viewpoint and informed citizenry essential to a healthy nation.
CONCLUSION
Despite many concerns, the Internet is in ascendance as the primary platform for
distribution of news, films, television, radio, podcasts, games, social media, and
other forms of cultural content. Technological innovation continues to expand the
availability for the content on home and mobile devices. As this technology
continues to evolve, the historical reliance on the broadcast spectrum for radio and
television will increasingly be eclipsed.
Over-the-air broadcasting once had many benefits, but the advent of new
technologies, the limitations of over-the-air broadcasting and the scarcity of the
bandwidth spectrum made this platform increasingly obsolete. From a historical and
regulatory perspective, however, it was precisely the nature of the airwaves that gave

305. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 953 (2018) (National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities); 20
U.S.C. § 954 (2018) (National Endowment for the Arts).
306. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n., Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (funding for public
libraries); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998) (upholding cash grants awarded
to artists).
307. Am. Libr. Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. at 204.
308. See 47 U.S.C. § 1452 (2018) (“The Commission shall conduct a reverse auction to determine
the amount of compensation that each broadcast television licensee would accept in return for
voluntarily relinquishing some or all of its broadcast television spectrum usage rights in order to make
spectrum available for assignment through a system of competitive bidding . . . .”).
309. There may, of course, be some small-station operators in their first three–year license that have
invested heavily and not had an opportunity to recoup their costs. Reasonable compensation might be
appropriate for station owners that can show actual harm in the change of policy. This is not, however,
the majority of license holders.
310. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 574 (“Throughout the NEA’s history, only a
handful of the agency’s roughly 100,000 awards have generated formal complaints about misapplied
funds or abuse of the public’s trust. Two provocative works, however, . . . led to congressional
revaluation of the NEA’s funding priorities and efforts to increase oversight of its grant–making
procedures.”).
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rise to the FCC and many of its jurisdictional powers. Particularly with regard to
media protected by the First Amendment, only the scarcity of the airwaves (and the
cable bandwidth that came after) provided the Commission its ability to regulate in
the public interest, requiring diversity of viewpoint that sometimes veered into the
compelled airing of content adverse to the position of the broadcaster.
The changes in economics and technology are driving media producers to the
Internet, and eventually, they will shed their historical connections to over-the-air
broadcast. As each company leaves the over-the-air broadcasting sphere, the FCC
loses much of its regulatory authority over that company.
Nonetheless, there are compelling government interests in a healthy media
environment, and some of these efforts can withstand constitutional scrutiny without
reliance on the scarcity doctrine. To promote the public interest of diversity of
viewpoint, Congress should expand funding for news, educational content, and
cultural content—building on what it has done over the past century. The FTC must
step into the void created by the FCC’s departure, enforcing both the FTC Act’s
provisions to assure that online advertising, customer privacy, and COPA protections
are rigorously enforced. The FTC must also reexamine the nature of the online
transactions to better reflect the Sherman Act and Clayton Act provisions of antitrust
regulation as it applies to this new model of media distribution.
There were many lessons learned by the FCC during the law’s development
from the Radio Act through the Communications Act and into the
Telecommunications Act. The media has changed but the audience has not. These
lessons are essential if the next century of telecommunications policy will be able to
help usher in another golden age and avoid the creation of an online media wasteland.
The transition from over-the-air broadcasting to an entirely online experience
has not occurred. But policy makers understand the days of broadcast are numbered.
As always, the time to prepare for the future is now.
Stay tuned.
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